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"NOT IN MY NEIGHBORHOOD:" LEGAL
CHALLENGES TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF
COMMUNITY RESIDENCES FOR THE
MENTALLY DISABLED IN NEW YORK STATE
Robert L. Schonfeld*
I. Introduction
Sharply critical investigations into the inhumane conditions at the
Willowbrook State School for the Mentally Retarded in Staten Island,
New York were undertaken in the early 1970's,' and subsequently,
* Assistant Attorney General, New York State Department of Law. Member
of New York and District of Columbia Bars. B.S. 1974, Cornell University, J.D.
1977, Fordham University. The author was the Research Editor of the Fordham
Urban Law Journal, Volume V, 1976-1977. The views expressed in this article do
not necessarily represent the views of the New York State Department of Law.
The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Thomas P. Dorsey, Esq. and
Lewis A. Golinker, Esq. of the New York Bar.
1. See, e.g., Kihss, U.S. Willowbrook Study Calls for Smaller Mental Hospitals,
N.Y. Times, Nov. 1, 1972, at 49, col. 4 [hereinafter cited as Willowbrook Study];
Sibley, Willowbrook Physician Doubts Report About Severe Injury as Result of
Fall, N.Y. Times, Sept. 30, 1972, at 35, col. 4; Narvaez, Albany Session Labeled
'Do Nothing', N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1972, at 24, col. 4; N.Y. Times, Feb. 5, 1972,
at 33, col. 1; id., Feb. 2, 1972, at 78, col. 4; id., Jan. 13, 1972, at 45, col. 1;
Sibley, Legislators Tour School for the Retarded, N.Y. Times, Dec. 21, 1971, at
35, col. 3. These articles describe various investigations undertaken by state and
local officials, the National Institute of Mental Health, the United States Department
of Health Education and Welfare, and WABC-TV newsman Geraldo Rivera. The
litigation concerning Willowbrook State School for the Mentally Retarded (Wil-
lowbrook) was brought by the New York State Association for Retarded Children,
Inc. (NYSARC). In one phase of the litigation, NYSARC v. Rockefeller, 357 F.
Supp. 752 (E.D.N.Y. 1973), the testimony illustrated the types of conditions existing
at Willowbrook. In its decision granting NYSARC a preliminary injunction, the
court noted:
Testimony of ten parents, plus affidavits of others, showed failure to
protect the physical safety of their children, and deterioration rather than
improvement after they were placed in Willowbrook School. The loss of
an eye, the breaking of teeth, the loss of part of an ear bitten off by
another resident, and frequent bruises and scalp wounds were typical of
the testimony. During eight months of 1972 there were over 1,300 reported
incidents of injury, patient assaults, or patient fights.
The number of ward attendants is below the level which even the Director
of Willowbrook thinks proper, and unauthorized absences worsen the
shortage. There are only half the number of doctors that are needed,
and nurses, physical therapists, recreation therapists, and other profes-
sional staff are in short supply ....
Physical maintenance is poor, with a backlog of 750 work orders and
at least one toilet inoperative in every battery of toilets.
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a lawsuit was filed in federal district court challenging the consti-
tutionality of those conditions.2 Spurred by those investigations, New
York State entered into the "Willowbrook Consent Decree" 3 which
required a reduction in the population at Willowbrook 4 and the
placement of Willowbrook residents into smaller community resi-
dences.5 However, when the state attempted to place residents from
Willowbrook and other institutions into the community, 6 it faced
These conditions are hazardous to the health, safety, and sanity of the
residents. They do not conform with the standards published by the
American Association on Mental Deficiency in 1964, or with the proposed
standards published on March 5, 1973 by the United States Department
of Health, Education and Welfare. A most striking deficiency is the
inadequate coverage of dayrooms, where the ratio is frequently 15 or
more residents per attendant on duty even for profoundly or severely
retarded residents.
Over three-fourths of the residents of Willowbrook are profoundly or
severely retarded, and -would require resident care personnel in the ratio
of 1:5 for the first shift, 1:7 for the second shift, and 1:15 for the third
shift, to comply with the 1964 A.A.M.D. Standards.
Id. at 756. See generally D.J. ROTHMAN, S.M. ROTHMAN, THE WILLOWBROOK WARS
(1984) (further describing conditions at Willowbrook) [hereinafter cited as ROTHMAN].
2. NYSARC v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. at 752; see Oelsner, 2 Suits Call
for Eventual Phase-Out of Willowbrook, N.Y. Times, Mar. 18, 1972, at*62, col.
5 [hereinafter cited as 2 Suits].
3. AMERICAN BAR Ass'N, COMM'N ON THE MENTALLY DISABLED, I MENTAL
DISABILITY L. REP. 58-68 (July-August 1976); see NYSARC v. Carey, 393 F.
Supp. 715, 717 (E.D.N.Y. 1975); see also N.Y. Times, Apr. 22, 1975, at 1, col.
2 (describing provisions of consent decree).
4. At the commencement of the lawsuit, there were approximately 5700 residents
at Willowbrook. NYSARC v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. at 755. At the time of
the trial, there were 3500 persons residing at Willowbrook. Prial, Problems Cited
at Willowbrook, N.Y. Times, Oct. 2, 1974, at 51, col. 7 [hereinafter cited as
Willowbrook Problems]. The consent decree required that Willowbrook house no
more than 250 persons. NYSARC v. Carey, 393 F. Supp. at 717. In 1985, there
were still 700 patients at Willowbrook and the federal government was planning
to deny Medicaid funds to Willowbrook due to federal health and safety standard
violations. Sullivan, U.S., Citing Violations, Plans to Deny $22 Million for Old
Willowbrook Site, N.Y. Times, Apr. 19, 1985, at Bi, col. 1.
5. NYSARC v. Carey, 393 F. Supp. at 717. As defined by the New York
State Mental Hygiene Law, a "community residential facility for the disabled" is
a supportive living facility with four to fourteen residents or a supervised
living facility subject to licensure by the office of mental health or the
office of mental retardation and developmental disabilities which provides
a residence for up to fourteen mentally disabled persons, including res-
idential treatment facilities for children and youth.
N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 41.34(a)(1) (McKinney Supp. 1984-1985). Community
residential facilities are operated pursuant to the state regulations stated at N.Y.
ADMIN. CODE tit. 14, §§ 86.1-86.12, 586.1-586.13, 686.1-686.4 (1983-1984). See §
86.6 which describes programs at community residences.
6. See, e.g., Smothers, Scarsdale's Retarded Get a New Home, A Mixed
Welcome, N.Y. Times, July 22, 1978, at 21, col. 3; Johnston, New Willowbrook
Holds an Open House, N.Y. Times, Oct. 31, 1977, at 54, col. 4; Kihss, For
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opposition from communities which voiced fears ranging from de-
creased property values to increased traffic and crime. 7 Consequently,
in 1978, the New York State Legislature enacted the Padavan Law8
which attempted to facilitate the development of community resi-
dences while giving municipalities some input into the selection of
residence locations. 9 While its drafters hoped that the statute would
Retarded, Finds Suspicion and Hostility, N.Y. Times, June 18, 1977, at 21, col.
1; N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 1976, at 27, col. 3.
7. See supra note 6; NEW YORK STATE SENATE MENTAL HYGIENE AND ADDICTION
CONTROL COMMITTEE, SITE SELECTION OF COMMUNITY RESIDENCES FOR THE MENTALLY
DISABLED: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE AND LEGISLATION 16-24 (1979) [hereinafter cited
as SITE SELECTION STUDY].
The fears of neighbors in New York State have proven to be unfounded. Studies
have shown that mentally retarded persons residing in community residences pose
fewer threats to their neighbors than other persons (R.A. LUBIN, M.P. JANICKI,
W. ZIGMAN & R. Ross, THE LIKELIHOOD OF POLICE CONTACTS WITH DEVELOP-
MENTALLY DISABLED PERSONS IN COMMUNITY RESIDENCES 5-6 (1982)) and that com-
munity residences do not decrease property values or cause neighborhood decline.
See L.W. DOLAN & J. WOLPERT, LONG TERM NEIGHBORHOOD PROPERTY IMPACTS
OF GROUP HOMES FOR MENTALLY RETARDED PEOPLE (1982); M.S. LINDAUER, P.
TUNG, & F. O'DONNELL, THE EFFECT OF COMMUNITY RESIDENCES FOR THE MENTALLY
RETARDED ON REAL-ESTATE VALUES IN THE NEIGHBORHOODS IN WHICH THEY ARE
LOCATED (1980); J. WOLPERT, GROUP HOMES FOR THE MENTALLY RETARDED, AN
INVESTIGATION OF NEIGHBORHOOD PROPERTY IMPACTS (1978). A decision by neighboring
Greenwich, Connecticut to reduce property taxes for those living near a community
residence on the grounds that the residence caused a decline in property values was
totally unsupported by concrete evidence. See Johnson, Taxes Cut for Neighbors
of Home for Mentally Ill, N.Y. Times, Apr. 11, 1985, at B2, col. 1.
8. 1978 N.Y. Laws ch. 468, § 2. The statute is named for State Senator Frank
Padavan, Chairman of the New York State Senate Mental Hygiene and Addiction
Control Committee.
9. The statute, as amended in 1981, provides in pertinent part:
(b) If a sponsoring agency intends to establish a residential facility for
the disabled within a municipality but does not have a specific site
selected, it may notify the chief executive officer of the municipality in
writing of its intentions and include in such notice a description of the
nature, size and community support requirements of the program. Pro-
vided, however, nothing in this subdivision shall preclude the proposed
establishment of a site pursuant to subdivision (c) of this section.
(c)(1) When a site has been selected by the sponsoring agency, it shall
notify the chief executive officer of the municipality in writing and include
in such notice the specific address of the site, the type of community
residence, the number of residents and the community support require-
ments of the program. Such notice shall also contain the most recently
published data compiled pursuant to section four hundred sixty-three of
the social services law which can reasonably be expected to permit the
municipality to evaluate all such facilities affecting the nature and char-
acter of the area wherein such proposed facility is to be located. The
municipality shall have forty days after the receipt of such notice to:
(A) Approve the site recommended by the sponsoring agency;
(B) suggest one or more suitable sites within its jurisdiction which could
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accommodate such a facility; or
(C) object to the establishment of a facility of the kind described by
the sponsoring agency because to do so would result in such a concen-
tration of community residential facilities for the mentally disabled in
the municipality or in the area in proximity to the site selected or a
combination of such facilities with other community residences or similar
facilities licensed by other agencies of state government that the nature
and character of the areas within the municipality would be substantially
altered.
Such response shall be forwarded to the sponsoring agency and the
commissioner. If the municipality does not respond within forty days,
the sponsoring agency may establish a community residence at a site
recommended in its notice.
(2) Prior to forwarding a response to the sponsoring agency and the
commissioner, the municipality may hold a public hearing pursuant to
local law.
(3) If the municipality approves the site recommended by the sponsoring
agency, the sponsoring agency shall seek to establish the facility at the
approved site.
(4) If the site or sites suggested by the municipality are satisfactory with
regard to the nature, size and community support requirements of the
program of the proposed facility and the area in which such site or sites
are located does not already include an excessive number of community
residential facilities for the mentally disabled or similar facilities licensed
by other state agencies, the sponsoring agency shall seek to establish its
facility at one of the sites designated by the municipality.
If the municipality suggests a site or sites which are not satisfactory to
the sponsoring agency, the agency shall so notify the municipality which
shall have fifteen days to suggest an alternative site or sites for the
proposed community residential facility.
(5) In the event the municipality objects to establishment of a facility
in the municipality because to do so would result in such a concentration
of community residential facilities for the mentally disabled or combi-
nation of such facilities and other facilities licensed by other state agencies
that the nature and character of areas within the municipality would be
substantially altered; or the sponsoring agency objects to the establishment
of a facility in the area or areas suggested by the municipality; or in
the event that the municipality and sponsoring agency cannot agree upon
a site, either the sponsoring agency or the municipality may request an
immediate hearing before the commissioner to resolve the issue. The
commissioner shall personally or by a hearing officer conduct such a
hearing within fifteen days of such a request.
In reviewing any such objections, the need for such facilities in the
municipality shall be considered as shall the existing concentration of
such facilities and other similar facilities licensed by other state agencies
in the municipality or in the area in proximity to the site selected and
any other facilities in the municipality or in the area in proximity to
the site selected providing residential services to a significant number of
persons who have formerly received in-patient mental health services in
facilities of the office of mental health or the office of mental retardation
and developmental disabilities. The commissioner shall sustain the ob-
jection if he determines that the nature and character of the area in
which the facility is to be based would be substantially altered as a result
of establishment of the facility. The commissioner shall make a deter-
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eliminate litigation over community residence sites, 10 instead the
statute has resulted in numerous lawsuits throughout New York State
challenging community residence sites.
This Article examines the laws and lawsuits which have affected
the establishment of community residences for the mentally disabled
in New York State. First, the Article traces the history of community
residences prior to the enactment of the Padavan Law in 1978.11
Thereafter, this Article analyzes the statute to determine whether its
procedures and interpretations by courts have been consistent with
the drafters' stated intentions. ' 2 In addition to examining the statutory
procedures, 3 this Article considers issues of zoning, 14 the statute's
constitutionality, 5 the standing of neighbors and neighborhood groups
to challenge community residence sites,' 6 and the effect of restrictive
covenants on community residences. 7 Finally, the Article looks at
the attempted use of preliminary injunctions and temporary re-
straining orders to delay the establishment of residences. 8 The Article
recommends that the New York State Legislature amend the Padavan
Law so that the statute will truly reflect the stated intentions of its
drafters. 19
mination within thirty days of the hearing.
(d) Review of a decision rendered by a commissioner pursuant to this
section may be had in a proceeding pursuant to article seventy-eight of
the civil practice law and rules commenced within thirty days of the
determination' of the commissioner.
(e) A licensing authority shall not issue an operating certificate to a
sponsoring agency for operation of a facility if the sponsoring agency
does not notify the municipality of its intention to establish a program
as required by subdivision (c) of this section. Any operating certificate
issued without compliance with the provisions of this section shall be
considered null and void and continued operation of the facility may be
enjoined.
(f) A community residence established pursuant to this section and family
care homes shall be deemed a family unit, for the purposes of local
laws and ordinances.
N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 41.34(b)-(f) (McKinney Supp. 1984-1985).
10. See 1978 McKinney's Sess. Laws at 1821-22 (memorandum of Governor
Carey); see also 1978 N.Y. Laws ch. 468, § 1 (declarations of legislative findings
and intent).
1 1. See infra notes 20-39 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 50-60 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 61-144 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 145-50 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 151-94 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 195-216 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 217-56 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 257-64 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 265-74 and accompanying text.
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1I. History of Community Residences Prior to the Padavan Law
While the 1970's witnessed New York State's greatest movement
towards deinstitutionalization and placement of mentally disabled
persons in community residences, the policy of deinstitutionalization
actually began in the 1950's.20 In 1954, the New York State Legislature
established community health boards2' for the purpose of developing
community treatment services,22 a program described by Governor
Thomas E. Dewey as one that "offer[ed] a unique opportunity to
reclaim the productive value of men and women who might otherwise
spend their days within the walls of a mental institution." 23 In 1967,
the state legislature amended the Mental Hygiene Law and Private
Housing Finance Law24 to direct the Commissioner of Mental Hygiene
to acquire or construct "community residential facilities to be op-
erated as hostels for the mentally retarded ' 25 and to grant financial
assistance to public or private nonprofit organizations for acquisition
or construction of such facilities.2 6 Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller,
20. SITE SELECTION STUDY, supra note 7, at 2. In the early 1900's, the Rome
State Custodial Asylum established a number of "colonies," which were actually
groups of residents placed with families. These colonies, however, died out during
the Depression years. See M.P. JANICKI, P.J. CASTELLANI & R.A. LUBIN, A PER-
SPECTIVE ON THE SCOPE AND STRUCTURE OF NEW YORK'S COMMUNITY RESIDENCE
SYSTEM 2 (1982) [hereinafter cited as JANICKI].
21. Community health boards were empowered to establish psychiatric clinics,
develop mental health services for schools and courts, provide in-patient services
in general hospitals for short-term treatment or observation, establish rehabilitation
services for the mentally ill, and devise other mental health services for the com-
munity. See 1954 N.Y. Laws ch. 10, § 190-c; 1954 McKinney's Sess. Laws at 1372.
22. 1954 N.Y. Laws ch. 10, § 1 states, in pertinent part:
§ 190-c Community mental health boards: powers and duties
Subject to the provisions of this chapter, and the regulations of the
commissioner, every board shall have the power to:
(a) review and evaluate community mental health services and facilities;
(b) submit to the appointing officer and governing body a program of
community mental health services and facilities;
(c) within amounts appropriated therefor, execute such program and
maintain such services and facilities as may be authorized under such
appropriations;
(d) enter into contracts for rendition or operation of services and facilities
on a per capita basis or otherwise;
(e) make rules and regulations concerning the rendition or operation of
services and facilities under its direction;
(f) appoint a psychiatrist, whose qualifications meet standards fixed by
the commissioner, to serve as director of the community mental health
service. Such director need not be a resident of the city or county and
he may be employed on a full or part-time basis.
23. 1954 McKinney's Sess. Laws at 1372 (memorandum of Governor Dewey).





upon signing the statute into law, noted that community residences
allowed the mildly retarded person to lead a reasonably full life in
dignity, self support and self respect and not to be committed to
almost complete dependency in a State institution.17
Early in the 1970's, when the deplorable conditions at Willowbrook
were being exposed, 2 various mental health experts and state leg-
islators recommended that the residents of large state institutions be
moved to smaller community residences. 29 They blamed the conditions
at Willowbrook and similar institutions on their large sizes.30 In its
federal lawsuit31 against New York State to improve conditions at
Willowbrook, the New York State Association for Retarded Children
sought, as part of its relief, the establishment of smaller community
facilities.3 2 The district court issued a preliminary injunction requiring
the state to upgrade staffing and other conditions at Willowbrook. 3
After a subsequent trial revealed shocking facts regarding the treat-
ment of residents at Willowbrook,3 4 New York State signed a consent
27. 1967 McKinney's Sess. Laws at 1531.
28. See supra note 1.
29. N.Y. Times, July 17, 1973, at 43, col. 2; id., Mar. 1, 1973, at 55, col. 2;
Clines, Democrats, on a Tour, Criticize The State's Retardation Services, N.Y.
Times, Mar. 8, 1972, at 36, col. 1; Sibley, U.S. Unit Concludes Study Here of
Mentally Retarded Centers, N.Y. Times, Mar. 1, 1972, at 48, col. 1; N.Y. Times,
Feb. 29, 1972, at 39, col. 4; Willowbrook Study, supra note 1, at 49, col. 4. The
experts included the Director of the National Institute of Mental Health, Bertram
Brown, and the U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare. The legislators
included Assemblypersons Brown, Krupsak and Steingut and Senator Conklin. Id.
30. See Willowbrook Study, supra note 1, at 49, col. 4; N.Y. Times, Feb. 29,
1972, at 39, col. 4.
31. See supra note 2.
32. 2 Suits, supra note 2, at 62, col. 5.
33. NYSARC v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. at 768-70. The court ordered a
prohibition against seclusion of residents, immediate and continuing repair of all
inoperable toilets, and immediate hiring of additional ward attendants, at least 85
more nurses, 30 more physical therapy personnel, 15" additional physicians, and
sufficient recreation staff. 357 F. Supp. at 768-69.
34. Willowbrook Problems, supra note 4, at 51, col. 7; Gerston, Parent Testifies
on Willowbrook, N.Y. Times, Nov. 1, 1974, at 43, col. 6; Gerston, Teacher Testifies
On Willowbrook, N.Y. Times, Oct. 31, 1974, at 25, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Oct. 30,
1974, at 49, col. 5; Prial, Willowbrook Negligence Cited By a Nurse in Court
Testimony, N.Y. Times, Oct. 8, 1974, at 45, col. 6; Moraghan, A Program for
the Retarded, Where the School Age Begins at 5 Weeks Old, N.Y. Times, Oct.
7, 1974, at 43, col. 1; Prial, Willowbrook Employe Forced Inmates to Try Sex,
Judge Told, N.Y. Times, Oct. 4, 1974, at 35, col. 5; Prial, Parents Say That
Willowbrook Is Harmful to Children There, N.Y. Times, Oct. 3, 1974, at 28, col.
4.
As an example of some of the more shocking testimony, a registered nurse
testified about a Willowbrook patient whose leg was in a cast:
Q. What did the cast itself look like?
1985]
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decree in April, 1975 requiring it to "take all steps necessary to
develop and operate a broad range of non-institutional community
facilities and programs to meet the needs of Willowbrook's residents
and of the class."
' 35
Following its signing of the consent decree, New York State
escalated its attempts to deinstitutionalize mentally disabled persons.16
A. It was rotted and broken in several places .... There was an extremely
foul odor from his cast, the odor of urine and feces.
Q. Did you notice anything unusual ... before the cast was removed?
A. Yes, there were maggots crawling out from underneath it .... We
picked them off the cast with forceps and put them in a covered jar.
Q. How many maggots did you find?
A. Before the cast was removed we picked off 35 or 40.
Q. When the cast was taken off?
A. There were numerous maggots in the wound itself. And there was
a large black bug embedded in the wound.
Q. I refer to one photograph ... Can you identify it.?
A. It is a photograph of the container with the maggots in it.
ROTHMAN, supra note 1, at 108. Much of the testimony, however, centered on the
advantages of deinstitutionalization and community placement of the retarded. Id.
at 108-11; see also Renelli v. State Comm'r of Mental Hygiene, 73 Misc. 2d 261,
266, 340 N.Y.S.2d 498, 503 (Sup. Ct. Richmond County 1973) (court found that
state was derelict in providing adequate care and treatment for Willowbrook resident
and ordered state to formulate specific program for resident to provide her with
treatment and care to afford her the opportunity to be taught elementary functions).
35. NYSARC v. Carey, 393 F. Supp. at 717. The decree mandated that within
six years of the date of the judgment, or May 5, 1981, the state reduce the
population of Willowbrook to 250 or fewer. Id. at 717. The state applied for and
received an extension of time to comply with this portion of this decree to April
1, 1985, on the ground that the procedures mandated by the Padavan Law and
the tight housing market in New York City made it difficult to achieve the goal
within the timetable agreed to. NYSARC v. Carey, 551 F. Supp. 1165, 1187-88
(E.D.N.Y. 1982), modified on appeal, 706 F.2d 956, 966 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
104 S. Ct. 277 (1983).
The vitality of the decree is in doubt anyway, considering that the federal court
refused to hold the state in contempt when other portions of the decree were not
followed. NYSARC v. Carey, 631 F.2d 162, 163-64 (2d Cir. 1980). Moreover, it
is questionable whether the state would sign a similar consent decree today, as the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals has since held that mentally disabled persons do
not have a constitutional right to placement in a community residence. Society for
Good Will to Retarded Children v. Cuomo, 737 F.2d 1239 (2d Cir. 1984).
36. See Johnston, New Willowbrook Holds An Open House, N.Y. Times, Oct.
31, 1977, at 54, col. 4; Kihss, Court-Ordered Winds of Change Touch Willowbrook,
N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 1977, at 21, col. 2; Clines, When Will the Willowbrooks
Vanish?, N.Y. Times, Nov. 30, 1976, at 36, col. 1; Peterson, Carey Calls for Local
Care of the Retarded and Unruly, N.Y. Times, Jan. 21, 1976, at 43, col. 2. The
threatened loss of federal funding unless the state depopulated its large institutions
also prompted the state to expedite its community residence program. See JANICKI,
supra note 20, at 5-6.
To illustrate the growth of community residences in New York State, there were
fewer than 10 residences in the State in 1970, about 130 in 1976 and over 1000
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However, the state and private sponsoring agencies with whom it
contracted to run community residences encountered opposition from
neighbors and municipalities to consideration of local sites.37 Al-
though several courts rejected municipality and homeowner associ-
ation claims that community residences were not single-family dwellings
for purposes of local zoning laws and ordinances permitting only
single-family dwellings in residential areas,3" other ' neighborhoods
by 1982. JANICKI, supra note 20, at 13. As of 1982, New York State had more
community residence beds than any other state, with the total for the state amounting
to more than ten percent of the total beds for the entire country. Id. The number
of persons residing in community residences rose from 904 in 1974 to more than
15,000 in 1984. Collins, State Officials Vow Help for Disabled, N.Y. Times, May
9, 1985, at C3, col. I.
37. See supra note 7.
38. Little Neck Community Ass'n v. Working Org. for Retarded Children, 52
A.D.2d 90, 383 N.Y.S.2d 364 (2d Dep't 1976), leave to appeal denied, 40 N.Y.2d
803, 356 N.E.2d 482, 387 N.Y.S.2d 1030 (1977); Incorporated Village of Freeport
v. Ass'n for the Help of Retarded Children, 94 Misc. 2d 1048, 406 N.Y.S.2d 221
(Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1977), aff'd, 60 A.D.2d 644, 400 N.Y.S.2d 724 (2d Dep't
1977). The community residences in these cases were found to be family-like in
structure. Id.; see also Conners v. NYSARC, 82 Misc. 2d 861, 370 N.Y.S.2d 474
(Sup. Ct. Rensselaer County 1975) (community residence premises purchased by
state immune from local zoning laws under theory of sovereign immunity although
residence would be used by private sponsoring agency). The Conners decision,
issued three years prior to the enactment of the Padavan Law, seems to imply
that a group of neighbors have the right, absent the existence of an independent
statute, to challenge the selection of a community residence site by the state as
being "beyond the parameters of reason and without a rational basis" pursuant
to Article 78 of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules. 82 Misc. 2d at 864-
65, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 477-78. This view would be untenable today in light of the
New York Court of Appeals decisions in Abrams v. New York City Transit Auth.,
39 N.Y.2d 990, 992, 355 N.E.2d 289, 290, 387 N.Y.S.2d 235, 236 (1976) and Jones
v. Beame, 45 N.Y.2d 402, 380 N.E.2d 277, 408 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1978). Those cases
held that discretionary, managerial decisions of the government were not subject
to judicial review absent a showing of a statutory violation. Independent of the
grounds for review provided in the Padavan Law, the decision on where to locate
a community residence would be a purely managerial, discretionary action on the
part of the state not subject to review. See Shannon v. Introne, 80 A.D.2d 834,
436 N.Y.S.2d 339 (2d Dep't 1981), aff'd, 53 N.Y.2d 929, 423 N.E.2d 818, 441
N.Y.S.2d 60 (1981); Karas v. New York State Office of Mental Retardation &
Developmental Disabilities, No. 15601/82 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1983), aff'd, 95
A.D.2d 984, 464 N.Y.S.2d 613 (1st Dep't 1983), lv. to appeal denied, 60 N.Y.2d
560 (1983); Romita v. New York State Office of Mental Retardation & Developmental
Disabilities, No. 4537/82 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1982); Nippes v. Kolb, No. 19642/
79 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1979).
In holding that the community residences for mentally retarded persons at issue
were single family dwellings for the purpose of local zoning laws and ordinances,
the decisions in Little Neck Community Ass'n and Incorporated Village of Freeport
were consistent with decisions finding that other types of group homes were single
family dwellings for local laws and ordinances. See Group House of Port Washington
v. Bd. of Zoning and Appeals of North Hempstead, 45 N.Y.2d 266, 380 N.E.2d
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attempted to use extra-legal means to block the establishment of
residences in their areas.3 9
207, 408 N.Y.S.2d 377 (1978) (foster care home of two permanent surrogate parents
and seven children was single family for purpose of zoning ordinance); City of
White Plains v. Ferraioli, 34 N.Y.2d 300, 313 N.E.2d 756, 357 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1974)
(group home of married couple, two children and ten foster children deemed single
family for purpose of zoning ordinance); Abbott House v. Village of Tarrytown,
34 A.D.2d 821, 312 N.Y.S.2d 841 (2d Dep't 1970) (zoning ordinance could not
be enforced against house for neglected children as such enforcement would be
contrary to and would thwart state policy). In People v. St. Agatha Home, 47
N.Y.2d 46, 389 N.E.2d 1098, 416 N.Y.S.2d 577 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 869
(1979), the New York Court of Appeals rejected an attempt of a county to gain
a criminal conviction of an operator of a home for persons in need of supervision
on the ground that the operator was violating a local zoning ordinance restricting
use to one-family occupancy. The court found that the requested conviction would
be contrary to county policy in favor of the establishment of such homes.
39. See supra note 7. See also ROTHMAN, supra note 1, which illustrates the
types of community harassment which occurred.
Communities ... could, and often did, convince the owner of the property
to be sold or leased to the state to cancel the agreement. In a handful
of very wealthy communities, like suburban Scarsdale, neighbors would
join together to buy the house themselves .... [blut not every community
could come up with one hundred or two hundred thousand dollars, and
so most of them had to resort to still other strategies. In some cases,
angry residents persuaded an owner to find another tenant or buyer,
particularly when he had a continuing stake in the area, by virtue of
either his business, his professional practice, or his other property hold-
ings. Thus one physician had initially been willing to lease a second
house that he owned in the Cobble Hill section of Brooklyn . . . so that
St. Vincent's, a Catholic charity, could open a group home. But when
neighbors protested, he backed off and refused to sign the lease.
At other times, community protest so prolonged the process of approval
that the owner tired of waiting and found another purchaser. Take the
case of 3350 Cross Bronx Expressway, a proposed group home in the
Bronx . . . . [T]he site was located in June 1978 and inspections were
completed by September 1978. [lI]n mid-October, Community Planning
Board 10 objected ostensibly because the house lacked a backyard and
was too near a highway. . . . Alternative sites were investigated and found
inadequate, whereupon the Board requested a formal hearing under the
Padavan Law. The hearing was held on February 9, 1979, and in March
the commissioner decided in favor of the site, at just which point the
owner sold the property to a different buyer.
In still other instances, . . . the situation could get nasty. Some opponents
were prepared to use scare tactics, ranging from abusive telephone calls
at all times of the day and night to outright threats of violence to the
owner and his family. [Although such incidents were not very common,
approximately] thirteen [such] incidents occurred. . . . Nevertheless, its
importance was greater than its frequency implied, first because these
incidents generally occurred . . . as . . . a last resort when the retarded
were about to arrive, which meant that the staff had invested great
energy in the project. Second, the recurring fear was that hooliganism
would be contagious, success in scaring off an owner in one neighborhood
serving as a lesson for another. Finally, these incidents were so morally
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III. The Padavan Law
In recognition of both the need to encourage the establishment
of community residences and deinstitutionalization and the concerns
of municipalities regarding the siting of residences, 40 the New York
outrageous as to raise the question whether integration of the retarded
was possible when prejudices ran so deep.
Still other communities resisted the opening of group homes by mustering
political influence. When local politicians with some clout in the city or
the state actively opposed a site and had the solid support of a core of
constituents, . . [they were often successful in preventing the opening
of group homes].
ROTHMAN, supra note 1, at 187-88; see also Society for Good Will to Retarded
Children v. Cuomo, 572 F. Supp. 1300, 1340 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), rev'd on other
grounds, 737 F.2d 1239 (2d Cir. 1984) (three instances of arson to community
residences on Long Island noted in testimony at trial).
40. See Governor's Program Bill No. 303 (1978), which states that the purpose
of the statute was:
[t]o involve municipalities in the process of selecting sites for community
residential programs for the mentally disabled; to foster the smooth
integration of the disabled into the communities in which they will live;
to promote the establishment of community-based residential facilities
for the disabled; to require careful and cooperative planning for such
facilities by state agencies and municipalities.
Id.
The Legislative Findings and Intent states:
[tihe legislature hereby finds and determines that mentally disabled in-
dividuals have the right to attain the benefits of normal residential
surroundings. It is further found that the opportunities for mentally
disabled individuals will be enhanced, and the delivery of services im-
proved, by providing these individuals with the least restrictive environ-
ment that is consistent with their needs, and that such environment will
foster the development of maximum capabilities. It is the intention of
this legislation to meet the needs of the mentally disabled in New York
state by providing, wherever possible, that such persons remain in normal
community settings, receiving such treatment, care, rehabilitation and
education, as may be appropriate to each individual. It is further intended
that communication and cooperation between the various state agencies,
local agencies and local communities be fostered by this legislation, and
that this will be best achieved by establishment of clearly defined pro-
cedures for the selection of locations for community residences . . . by
local communities. In the establishment of such community residences,
the legislature recognizes the need to avoid, wherever practicable, a
disproportionate distribution of community residences and other similar
facilities.
Act of July 6, 1978, 1978 N.Y. Laws ch. 468, § 1.
Governor Carey's memorandum accompanying the enactment of the statute states:
[tihe national movement towards providing care and treatment for the
mentally disabled in the least restrictive environment consistent with their
needs has generated a great demand for community residential facilities
for persons formerly served in State institutions. The rapid development
of such facilities in the late sixties and early seventies, particularly when
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State Legislature enacted the Padavan Law. 41 The statute sets forth
mandatory procedures for the establishment of community residences
for the mentally disabled, 42 permits municipalities only limited in-
added to the uncoordinated establishment of similar types of residential
accomodations for other client groups, has in some instances drastically
altered the nature and character of certain communities in this state. As
a result, many such communities have strongly resisted the establishment
of residential facilities for the mentally disabled.
Without community participation in the site selection process, there is
a real possibility that residents of the facility will be unwelcome neighbors,
ostracized from the life of the community which is expected to provide
them with sustenance. Far from achieving the benevolent objective of
improving their lot and providing them with more humane and dignified
care at a time of severe need, they may become objects of fear, ridicule,
hostility and deprivation.
These bills, developed jointly by the Offices of Mental Health and Mental
Retardation and Developmental Disabilities, the Senate and Assembly
Mental Hygiene Committees and my staff, implement a far-reaching
program to place the dynamic relationship between State and local gov-
ernments and voluntary providers of care to the mentally ill, mentally
retarded and developmentally disabled upon a new footing.
Senate Bill 8213-B implements my program objective, announced in my
State of the State Message, of assuring the involvement of local gov-
ernments in the process of determining where new community residential
facilities will be located. This bill prohibits the issuance of an operating
certificate for any new facility unless the operator of the facility complies
with the newly established procedures requiring notice to the municipality
and an opportunity to suggest suitable sites. It further requires the
Commissioners of the Office of Mental Health or the Office of Mental
Retardation and Developmental Disabilities to sustain an objection to
the establishment of a new community residence if he finds that the
nature and character of the area in which the facility is to be based
would be substantially altered as a result of the establishment of the
facility.
At the same time, the bill aims to facilitate the establishment of community
residences by discouraging frivolous legal challenges that have needlessly
delayed proper establishment of such facilities in the past, at great cost
to the litigants. This legislation attempts to encourage a process of joint
discussion and accomodation between the providers of care and services
to the mentally disabled and representatives of the community, rather
than legal antagonism. ...
These bills clearly comprise the most important mental hygiene legislation
of this session. It is my earnest hope that they will assist the State
government, acting through its various agencies, to forge a new partnership
with local governments, consumers and providers in developing the type
of network of community services that was envisioned when this nation
moved away from the back wards and towards the least restrictive
environment.
1978 McKinney's Sess. Laws at 1821-22.
41. 1978 N.Y. Laws ch. 468, § 2.
42. See supra note 9.
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volvement in the process of selecting community residence sites43 and
declares that community residences established pursuant to the statute
are single-family dwellings for the purposes of local laws and or-
dinances.4 4 The statute received mixed reviews from agencies seeking
to establish community residences as well as from municipalities. 41
This section of the Article first will examine legislative and ex-
ecutive memoranda which state the goals of the Padavan Law's
drafters. 46 It then will analyze the Padavan Law procedures and
court interpretations thereof to determine whether those procedures
and interpretations fulfill the goals of the drafters of the statute.4 1
In this regard, the applicability of the statute, procedures for no-
tifying a municipality about the proposed establishment of a com-
munity residence, objections a municipality can raise to the
establishment of a residence, fact-finding hearings on proposed com-
munity residence sites, commissioners' determinations rendered after
fact-finding hearings and court review of commissioners' determi-
43. The only objection that a municipality may raise to a community residence
is that it would
result in such a concentration of community residential facilities for the
mentally disabled in the municipality or in the area in proximity to the
site selected or a combination of such facilities with other community
residences or similar facilities licensed by other agencies of state gov-
ernment that the nature and character of the areas within the municipality
would be substantially altered.
N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 41.34(c)(1)(C) (McKinney Supp. 1984-1985).
Also, the municipality must present evidence of a "concrete and . . . convincing
nature" to prevail on its objection. Grasmere Homeowners Ass'n v. Introne, 84
A.D.2d 778, 779, 443 N.Y.S.2d 956, 957 (2d Dep't 1981); see infra notes 95-144
and accompanying text.
44. Mental Hygiene Law § 41.34(f) specifically states that "[a] community
residence established pursuant to this section ... shall be deemed a family unit,
for the purposes of local laws and ordinances." N.Y, MENTAL HYO. LAW § 41.34(f)
(McKinney Supp. 1984-1985).
45. The bill jacket for the statute indicates that approval of the bill came from
the New York Association for the Learning Disabled, the New York State Health
Planning Commission, the New York Mental Health Association, the New York
State Office of Mental Health and the New York State Office of Mental Retardation
and Developmental Disabilities, United Cerebral Palsy, the Association of the Bar
of the City of New York, the Fulton County Chapter of the New York State
Association for Retarded Children, Inc., and the New York State Association of
Counties. Groups that opposed the statute were the Board of Visitors for Rockland
Psychiatric Center, the New York State Bar Association Committee on Mental
Hygiene, the Schenectady Association to Retain Residential Zoning, and the City
of Schenectady. The New York State Department of Social Services and the New
York Conference of Mayors expressed mixed views about the statute. Assembly
Bill No. 8768, bill jacket (available in Fordham Law School Library).
46. See infra notes, 50-60 and accompanying text.
47. See infra 61-144 and accompanying text.
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nations will be discussed. 48 Finally, this section will examine the
statute's impact on zoning and other local ordinances, the consti-
tutionality of the statute, and the standing of neighbors' and home-
owner associations to challenge community residences under the
statute.
49
A. Legislative and Executive Memoranda on the Goals of the
Padavan Law
Both the state legislature in enacting the Padavan Law50 and
Governor Hugh L. Carey in signing it into law5 issued memoranda
expressing their views as to what the Padavan Law was intended
to accomplish. These memorializations make it possible to determine
whether the statute and its interpretation by the courts truly serve
the purposes expounded by the statute's drafters. 2
The Padavan Law was accompanied by a statement entitled "Dec-
laration of legislative findings and intent" (Declaration)." The Dec-
laration, which strongly expresses the policy favoring
deinstitutionalization and community residences, states:
The legislature hereby finds and determines that mentally dis-
abled individuals have the right to attain the benefits of normal
residential surroundings. It is further found that the opportunities
for mentally disabled individuals will be enhanced, and the delivery
of services improved, by providing these individuals with the least
restrictive environment that is consistent with their needs, and
that such environment will foster the development of maximum
capabilities. It is the intention of this legislation to meet the needs
of the mentally disabled in New York [SItate by providing, wher-
ever possible, that such persons remain in normal community
settings, receiving such treatment, care, rehabilitation and edu-
cation, as may be appropriate to each individual . . . 4
Further, the Declaration emphasized that "[i]n the establishment of
such community residences, the legislature recognizes the need to
avoid, wherever practicable, a disproportionate distribution of com-
munity residences and other similar facilities." 5 On balance, however,
48. Id.
49. See infra notes 145-216 and accompanying text.
50. 1978 N.Y. Laws ch. 468, § 1.
51. 1978 McKinney's Sess. Law at 1821-22.
52. The statute was developed cooperatively by the Offices of Mental Health
and Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities, the Senate and Assembly
Mental Hygiene Committees, and the Governor's Staff. Id. at 1821.





the Declaration was a strong statement favoring the establishment
of community residences and an indication that the legislature in-
tended the statute to facilitate their development. According to the
Declaration, the only limitation to be placed on the development
of residences was that there not be a "disproportionate distribution '5 6
of such residences. Thus, based upon the legislature's Declaration,
the Padavan Law should be construed liberally in favor of the
development of community residences.17
The Governor's memorandum58 echoed the pro-community resi-
dence sentiments of the legislature. While the Governor's message
noted that the statute assured "the involvement of local governments
in the process of determining where new community residential
facilities w[ould] be located," 5 9 it also stated that
the bill aims to facilitate the establishment of community residences
by discouraging frivolous legal challenges that have needlessly
delayed proper establishment of such facilities in the past, at great
cost to the litigants .... It is my earnest hope that they (the
bills) will assist the State government ... [in] forg[ing] a new
partnership with local governments, consumers and providers in
developing the type of network of community services that was
envisioned when this nation moved away from the back wards and
towards the least restrictive environment.' °
56. Id.
57. Indeed, the courts have taken the position that substantial rather than strict
compliance with the procedures of the statute is necessary. See Town of Pleasant
Valley v. Wassaic Developmental Disabilities Servs. Office, 92 A.D.2d 543, 459
N.Y.S.2d 109 (2d Dep't 1983); Community Bd. No. 3 v. New York Office of
Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities, 76 A.D.2d 851, 428 N.Y.S.2d
520 (2d Dep't 1980), appeal dismissed, 53 N.Y.2d 839 (1981); Town of Webster
v. Slezak, No. 1993-82 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1982).
Perhaps the strongest statement that the statute should be read in favor of
establishing residences and against the promotion of legal challenges to such res-
idences is the New York Court of Appeals' decision in Crane Neck Ass'n v. New
York City/Long Island County Servs. Group, 61 N.Y.2d 154, 460 N.E.2d 1336,
472 N.Y.S.2d 901 (1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 60 (1984). In Crane Neck, the
Court noted that "[a] major purpose of section 41.34 ... was to eliminate the
legal challenges that were impeding implementation of the State policy" (of es-
tablishing community residences). 61 N.Y.2d at 164, 460 N.E.2d at 1341, 472
N.Y.S.2d at 906-07.
58. 1978 McKinney's Sess. Laws at 1821-22.
59. Id. at 1821. Although much of the language of the Governor's memoranda
and some of the language of the Declaration of Legislative Findings and Intent
talk about the need for cooperation between municipalities and sponsoring agencies,
the two documents together demonstrate a strong preference for the development
of community residences and a strict limit on the types of objections that can be
raised against them.
60. Id. at 1821-22. Of importance in the Governor's memoranda is a description
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B. Padavan Law Procedures
1. Applicability
Before discussing the actual procedures of the Padavan Law, it
is necessary to outline the types of facilities to which the statute
and its procedures are applicable. The Padavan Law is applicable
only to sponsoring agencies6" intending to establish community
residences for the mentally disabled62 licensed by either the New York
State Office of Mental Health or the New York State Office of Men-
tal Retardation and Developmental Disabilities.63 The procedural
requirements" imposed on sponsoring agencies seeking to establish
of a relationship between local governments and sponsoring agencies in the site
selection process. As will be discussed in more detail later, this is evidence that
the drafters of the statute, the Governor's staff members being among them, did
not intend that sponsoring agencies be the target of litigation from neighbors and
homeowner groups. See infra notes 195-216 and accompanying text.
Other states have adopted similar statutes and policy statements aimed at facil-
itating the establishment of community residences for the mentally disabled and
granting community residences priority over local zoning ordinances. See, e.g., CAL.
WELF. & INST. CODE § 5115 (West 1984); COLO. REv. STAT. § 31-23-303(2)(a) (1977
& Supp. 1984); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 333 E-3.5 (Supp. 1983); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 16-13-21-14 (Burns Supp. 1984); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 4962-A (Supp.
1983-1984); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 125.216a (West Supp. 1984-1985); MINN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 245.812, 462.357(7)(3) (West Supp. 1985); MONT. CODE
ANN. §§ 53-20-101, 53-20-301 (1983); NEB. REV. STAT § 18-1745-47 (1983);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 278.021 (1983); N.J. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:55D-66.1 (West
Supp. 1984-1985); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 168-20 to -23 (1982); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 6 5123.19(D) (Page 1981 & Supp. 1983); R.1. GEN. LAWS §§ 45-24-22, 45-
24-23 (1980 & Supp. 1984); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-21-20 (Law. Co-op. 1976); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 13-24-102 (1980); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 4409 (1979 & Supp.
1984); VA. CODE § 15.1-486.2 (1981).
61. A sponsoring agency can be any agency or unit of government, a voluntary
agency, or any other person or organization which intends to establish or operate
a community residence. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 41.34(a)(2) (McKinney Supp.
1984-1985). A municipality, having limited grounds upon which it can challenge a
community residence, cannot challenge a community residence on the ground that
the sponsoring agency is unqualified to care for mentally disabled persons. See id.
§ 41.34(c)(1)(C), (c)(5) (McKinney Supp. 1984-1985). The Commissioner retains the
power to deny an operating certificate to an unqualified sponsoring agency. Id.
§§ 31.02, 31.05 (McKinney 1978 and Supp. 1984-1985). The Padavan procedures are
mandatory. Id. § 41.34(e) (McKinney Supp. 1984-1985).
62. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 41.34(a)(1) (McKinney Supp. 1984-1985).
63. Id. The statute is only applicable to residence sites which, in the opinion
of the Commissioner, were selected after September 1, 1978. 1978 N.Y. Laws ch.
468, § 4. See Community Bd. No. 3 v. New York Office of Mental Retardation
and Developmental Disabilities, 76 A.D.2d 851, 428 N.Y.S.2d 520 (2d Dep't 1980),
appeal dismissed, 53 N.Y.2d 839 (1981); Gedney Ass'n v. New York State Dep't
of Mental Hygiene, 112 Misc. 2d 209, 446 N.Y.S.2d 876 (Sup. Ct. Westchester
County 1982).
64. See infra notes 79-144 and accompanying text for discussion of procedures.
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community residences for the mentally disabled65 are not placed on
agencies seeking to establish community residences which are licensed
by the department of social services, 66 the division of substance abuse
services, 67 the department of corrections, 68 the division for youth 69
or any other state agency for other disabled or needy persons.70
Thus, the Padavan Law actually makes it more difficult procedurally
for a sponsoring agency to establish a community residence for
mentally disabled persons than for. other types of disabled persons
in most instances.7' This result is contrary to the stated aims of the
drafters of the statute.72
65. N.Y. MENTAL HY6. LAW § 41.34(c)(1) (McKinney Supp. 1984-1985).
66. Id. § 41.34(a)(1).
67. Id.; see also Nippes v. Kolb, No. 19642/79 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1979)
(methadone center not required to give notice of its opening to local community
planning board).
68. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 41.34(a)(1) (McKinney Supp. 1984-1985).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. The New York State Office of Mental Retardation and Developmental
Disabilities has testified that procedures of the statute have delayed the establishment
of residences and that residences were even lost because of the statutory timetable
that must be followed. NYSARC v. Carey, 551 F. Supp. 1165, 1187-88 (E.D.N.Y.
1982). The Second Circuit acknowledged that the delays created by the statutory
procedures were justification for granting the State a four-year extension of time
to move persons from Willowbrook to smaller community residences under the
Willowbrook Consent Decree. NYSARC v. Carey, 706 F.2d 956, 966 (2d Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 277 (1984).
There is actually a class of community residences that has benefited from the
Padavan Law. As discussed in the text accompanying notes 145-50, the Padavan
Law declares that all community residences established through its procedures are
single family dwellings for the purposes of local laws and ordinances. As discussed
supra at note 38, community residences run by private agencies that had a family-
like structure were construed by the courts as single family dwellings prior to the
enactment of the Padavan Law. Also, state-operated facilities are immune from
local laws and ordinances under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, as is discussed
supra at note 38 and infra at note 150. However, it is quite likely that community
residences run by private sponsoring agencies that were not family-like in structure
would not have been deemed single family dwellings for the purpose of local laws
and ordinances and may have been banned from certain residential areas prior to
the Padavan Law. See Crane Neck Ass'n v. New York City/Long Island County
Servs. Group, 61 N.Y.2d 154, 160, 460 N.E.2d 1336, 1339, 472 N.Y.S.2d 901, 904
(1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 60 (1984), where the New York Court of Appeals
held that a community residence that was not family-like in structure would likely
not have been deemed a single family dwelling for the purpose of local laws and
ordinances. Thus, the Padavan Law has facilitated the development of non-family-
like community residences by private sponsoring agencies in that they can now be
established in residential areas permitting only single family dwellings. Some com-
mentators believe that the statute has encouraged the development of residences.
See infra notes 267-68 and accompanying text.
72. See supra notes 50-60 and accompanying text.
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Originally, the Padavan law applied only to sponsoring agencies
seeking to establish supervised community residences for four to
fourteen mentally disabled persons. 73 While the "four to fourteen"
requirement appeared to be arbitrary, courts correctly held that the
statute did not apply to community residences containing three74 or
twenty 75 persons on the ground that the courts could not alter the
statute's specific "four to fourteen" language no matter how ar-
bitrary it seemed. 76 The 1981 amendments77 extended the coverage
of the statute to supervised residences for one to fourteen persons
and supportive residences for four to fourteen persons .7 The amend-
ment requiring sponsoring agencies of supervised residences for one
or two persons to follow the procedures of the statute is contrary
to the original goals of the statute-facilitation of the development
73. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 41.34(a)(1) (McKinney Supp. 1978-1979), amended,
1981 N.Y. Laws ch. 1024, § 3; id. ch. 1025, § 1.
74. Shannon v. Introne, 80 A.D.2d 834, 835, 436 N.Y.S.2d 337, 339 (2d Dep't),
aff'd, 53 N.Y.2d 929, 423 N.E.2d 818, 441 N.Y.S.2d 60 (1981).
75. Romita v. New York State Office of Mental Retardation and Developmental
Disabilities, No. 4537/82, slip'. op. at 9 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1982).
76. The courts in Shannon and Romita correctly applied the principle that where
the words of a statute are free from ambiguity and doubt., there is no need to
resort to other means of interpretation. See, e.g., Meltzer v. Koenigsberg, 302 N.Y.
523, 525, 99 N.E.2d 679, 680 (1951).
77. 1981 N.Y. Law*s ch. 1024, § 3; id. ch. 1025, § 1.
78. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 41.34(a)(1) (McKinney Supp. 1984-1985). A
supervised community residence is one providing supervisory staff on-site 24 hours
per day for the purpose of enabling residents to live as independently as possible.
Id. § 1.03(28-a). A supportive living residence is one providing practice in independent
living under supervision but not providing staff on-site on a 24 hour per day basis.
Id. § 1.03(28-b).
The bill jacket for the 1981 amendments indicates opposition to the amendments
from the Division of the Budget, the State Advocate for the Disabled, the Richmond
Fellowship of New York, Inc., the Association of Community Living Administrators
in Mental Health, the New York State Mental Health Association, Inc., Mental
Health Services Corporation 2, Binghamton Catholic Charities, Federation of Parents
Organizations for the New York State Mental Institutions, Inc., Catholic Charities
Diocese of Brooklyn, Family Service Association of Nassau County, Woodward
Mental Health Center, Mental Health Association of Nassau County, Suffolk
Community Council, Inc., Unity House, North County Transitional Living Services,
Inc. and the Family Residences & Essential Enterprises, Inc. Surprisingly, the New
York State Office of Mental Health, the New York State Commission on Quality
of Care for the Mentally Disabled, the New York State Office for the Aging, the
New York State Health Planning Commission, and the New York State Conference
of Local Mental Hygiene Directors had no objection to the statute amendments,
while, unsurprisingly, the New York Conference of Mayors and Municipal Officers
and the New York Association of Counties supported the amendments. Assembly
Bill No. 8768, bill jacket (available in Fordham Law School Library). The amend-
ments apply to community residence sites which, in the judgment of the commis-
sioner, were selected after January 10, 1982. 1981 N.Y. Laws ch. 1024, § 4; id.
ch. 1025, § 2.
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of community residences-since it would be unduly burdensome for
a sponsoring agency to follow the intricate statutory procedures for
one or two persons. Moreover, it is difficult to envision how a
community residence for one or two persons or a concentration of
such residences would have any adverse impact on a neighborhood.
2. Notification
To establish a community residence, a sponsoring agency first
must send written notification to the chief executive officer of the
targeted municipality 79 announcing its intention to establish a resi-
dence there. s0 Prior to the 1981 amendments,. the sponsoring agency
was required to include in its notice to the chief executive officer
only a description of the nature, size and community support re-
quirements of the program."1 The agency was not required to name
a specific site or have a specific site in mind when sending the
letter, and courts have unanimously upheld the validity of such
notification letters.12 However, the statute was amended in 1981 to
79. For the purpose of the Padavan Law, as applied outside of New York
City, the term "municipality" means an incorporated village or city if the facility
is to be located therein or the town if the facility is not located within an incorporated
village or city. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 41.34(a)(3) (McKinney Supp. 1984-1985).
In New York City, the relevant municipality is the community planning board. Id.
A county is only required to be notified where a voluntary agency is seeking state
aid to establish a residence. Id. § 41.33 (McKinney Supp. 1984-1985).
80. Id. § 41.34(c)(1) (McKinney Supp. 1984-1985).
81. Id. § 41.34(b)(1) (McKinney Supp. 1978-1979), amended b 1981 N.Y. Laws,
ch. 1024 § 3.
82. Community Planning Board No. 18 v. Introne, 84 A.D.2d 564, 443 N.Y.S.2d
262 (2d Dep't 1981); Town of Stony Point v. New York State Office of Mental
Retardation & Development Disabilities, 78 A.D.2d 858, 432 N.Y.S.2d 633 (2d
Dep't 1980); Cosgrove v. Introne, No. 1025/80 (Sup. Ct. Orange County 1982);
Town of Pleasant Valley v. Wassaic Developmental Disabilities Servs. Offices, No,
4967/80 (Sup. Ct. Dutchess County 1981); Town of Cortlandt v. Office of Mental
Retardation and Developmental Disabilities, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 29, 1981, at 13, col.
6 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1981); cf. Town of Pleasant Valley v. Wassaic
Developmental Disabilities Servs. Office, 92 A.D.2d 543, 459 N.Y.S.2d 109 (2d
Dep't 1983) (court held that sponsoring agency violated letter and spirit of statute
by intentionally omitting any reference to proposed specific sites in its notification
letter, but upheld sponsoring agency's actions on ground that agency informed
municipality about specific sites and municipality was not precluded from introducing
evidence or in any way prejudiced by sponsoring agency's actions).
The Westchester County Supreme Court decision in Town of Cortlandt v. Office
of Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities is typical of the type of
attitudes sponsors of community residences must sometimes face from local courts.
While the court found that the initial statute and prior case law clearly stated that
a sponsoring agency did not have to provide a municipality with a specific site,
the court added:
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require notification letters to mention specific sites.83
By requiring a sponsoring agency to find a suitable site prior to
commencing Padavan procedures, this amendment impedes the de-
velopment of community residence sites. Further, the specific site
requirement forces sponsoring agencies either to purchase the site
before commencing Padavan Law procedures, 4 thereby risking the
possibility of owning an unusable house if the municipality pre-
vails in its objections to the site,85 or to spend extra money to
purchase options to buy the house during the Padavan procedures.
Similarly, the provision discourages sellers from offering their
houses to sponsoring agencies since the sellers may have to await
the outcome of the Padavan procedures before knowing whether
the agency will actually purchase their home.8 6 Moreover, the re-
quired notice of a specific site, if leaked to the neighborhood of
the proposed site, could lead to neighborhood groups either pres-
suring the municipality to oppose the site or attempting to stop the
establishment of the residence themselves through extra-legal87 or
It appears to this court that Section 41.34 of the Mental Hygiene Law
is a very unfair law and is in violation of the spirit of the Municipal
Home Rule Law of the State of New York. In the court's opinion, it
grants excessive discretionary powers to a bureaucratic department whose
personnel is motivated primarily, if not solely, in carrying out the func-
tion of the Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities Office rather
than looking at the questions from a broader point of view. In this court's
judgment, the statute should be amended to give the municipality involved
more input into the selection of a group home site. The court might
point out that the respondent refused to reveal to the petitioner the
location in the Town of Cortlandt where the respondent planned to place
the group home until directed to do so by the court on the day that
this proceeding was argued. In the opinion of this court, such conduct
verges upon bureaucratic arrogance.
N.Y.L.J., Jan. 29, 1981, at 14, col. 1.
83. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 41.34(c)(1) (McKinney Supp. 1984-1985); 1981
N.Y. Laws ch. 1024, § 3.
84. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 41.34(c)(1) (McKinney Supp. 1984-1985). A
private sponsoring agency may purchase a residence prior to the commencement
of Padavan Law procedures. Town of Oyster Bay v. Mental Health Ass'n of
Nassau County No. 23069/83 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1983). However, unlike
other states, New York does not guarantee mortgages for voluntary agencies so
that they can secure mortgages more easily. Society for Good Will and Retarded
Children v. Cuomo, 572 F. Supp. 1300, 1340 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), rev'd on other
grounds, 737 F.2d 1239 (2d Cir. 1984).
85. See, e.g., N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 41.34(c)(5) (McKinney Supp. 1984-
1985) which states that sponsoring agencies cannot use a proposed residence for
a community residence if the municipality's position is upheld.
86. See id.
87. See People v. 11 Cornwell Co., 695 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1982), vacated in
part on other grounds, 718 F.2d 22 (2d Cir. 1983), where a group of neighbors
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legal means."8 An argument can be made that the inclusion of a
specific site affords the municipality a better opportunity to make
a response to the sponsoring agency's notification letter.89 How-
ever, the Padavan Law has always given municipalities the right to
object to the establishment of residences within their jurisdictions
even where no specific sites were listed 90 or to suggest areas within
their jurisdiction where the residence would be suitable. 91
The 1981 amendments also require sponsoring agencies to provide
municipalities with "the most recently published data compiled pur-
suant to section four hundred sixty-three of the social services law
which can reasonably be expected to permit the municipality to
evaluate all such facilities affecting the nature and character of the
areas wherein such proposed facility is to be located." ' 92 This data
constitutes a listing of all community residences and institutions in
the proximity of the proposed community residence. 93 The clause,
"which can reasonably be expected to permit the municipality to
evaluate all such facilities affecting the nature and character of the
areas wherein such proposed facility is to be located," 94 is vague
and may result in some litigation. However, the requirement is not
difficult for sponsoring agencies to meet, and it does provide a
municipality with useful information with which to make an intel-
of a proposed community residence site pooled their money together and purchased
a site proposed by a sponsoring agency for the purpose of blocking the sponsoring
agency from establishing a residence there. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals
held that the neighbors' action violated Executive Law § 296(5), the section of the
New York State Human Rights Law prohibiting discrimination in real property
transactions against handicapped persons. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296(5) (McKinney
1982 & Supp. 1984).
88. Neighbors and homeowners associations have been given standing to challenge
the establishment of community residence sites. See infra notes 195-216 and ac-
companying text.
89. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 41.34(c)(1)(A), (B), (C) (McKinney Supp.
1984-1985).
90. See id. § 41.34(b)(1)(C) (McKinney Supp. 1978-1979). See City of Schenectady
v. Coughlin, 74 A.D.2d 985, 426 N.Y.S.2d 328 (3d Dep't 1980), where the com-
missioner found that a sponsoring agency could not locate in certain areas of the
city because of overconcentration but could locate in an unsaturated area.
91. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 41.34(c)(1)(B) (McKinney Supp. 1984-1985).
92. Id. § 41.34(c)(1) (McKinney Supp. 1984-1985).
93. N.Y. Soc. SERVS. LAW § 463-a (McKinney 1983); N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE
LAW § 41.34(c)(1) (McKinney Supp. 1984-1985). The data compiled pursuant to
Social Services Law § 463-a, known as "Social Services Law Registry," includes
listings of both community residences and institutions. However, not all of the
listings on the registry are relevant to the matters that the Commissioner must
consider in ruling on a municipality's objections to a community residence proposal.
See infra notes 128-34 and accompanying text.
94. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 41.34(c)(1) (McKinney Supp. 1984). See supra
note 92 and accompanying text for language of this clause.
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ligent response to the sponsoring agency's notification letter. A
sponsoring agency giving the most recent data for as large an area
as possible should not receive any serious challenge on this point
in litigation.
3. The Municipality's Response
Within forty days of receipt of the sponsoring agency's notification
letter, 95 the municipality, if it chooses to respond, must make one
of three statutorily mandated responses. 96 It must either:
(A) Approve the site recommended by the sponsoring
agency;
(B) [S]uggest one or more suitable sites within its juris-
diction which could accomodate such a facility; or
(C) [O]bject to the establishment of a facility of the kind
described by the sponsoring agency because to do so
would result in such a concentration of community
residential facilities for the mentally disabled in the
municipality or in the area in proximity to the site
selected[ 97] or a combination of such facilities with
other community residences or similar facilities licensed
by other agencies of state government that the nature
and character of the areas within the municipality
would be substantially altered. 98
Thus, the grounds for a municipality's objection to a proposed
site are limited to whether the residence would create a concentration
of community and other similar residences which would substantially
alter the area in which the proposed residence is to be located. 99 A
95. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW §41.34(c)(1) (McKinney Supp. 1984-1985).
96. Id. § 41.34(c)(1)(A), (B), (C) (McKinney Supp. 1984-1985). A municipality
may hold a public hearing pursuant to local law prior to making a response, id.
§ 41.34(c)(2) (McKinney Supp. 1984-1985), but cannot force the sponsoring agency
to comply with procedures additional to those required in the Padavan Law. Cosgrove
v. Introne, No. 1025/80 (Sup. Ct. Orange County 1982).
97. Prior to the 1981 amendment, the municipality could only object to an
overconcentration of facilities located in the municipality. 1981 N.Y. Laws ch.
1024, § 3. This led to the illogical result that a municipality could not point to
facilities that might just be over the municipality's borders to show overconcen-
tration. See Spielman v. Introne, 88 A.D.2d 958, 451 N.Y.S.2d 194 (2d Dep't
1982). The 1981 amendment corrected the oversight of the original statute.
98. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 41.34(c)(1)(A), (B), (C) (McKinney Supp. 1984-
1985).
99. See, e.g., Town of Greenburgh v. Coughlin, 73 A.D.2d 672, 423 N.Y.S.2d
209 (2d Dep't 1979), Iv. to appeal denied, 49 N.Y.2d 704, 404 N.E.2d 1341, 427
N.Y.S.2d 1025 (1980) and Town of Hempstead v. Comm'r, 78 A.D.2d 677, 432
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municipality cannot object to a community residence site on the
ground that the residence itself would create more traffic, crime or
garbage, lower property values'0° or would be unsafe for the persons
who would reside there. 10 Moreover, a mere assertion by a munic-
ipality of a concentration of residences in the area is legally insuf-
ficient to form a statutory objection-a municipality must allege
and prove both that the proposed residence would create an over-
concentration of residences and that said overconcentration would
result in the substantial alteration of the area. 02
If the municipality approves the proposed community residence
site or fails to respond within forty days of its receipt of the
notification letter, the sponsoring, agency can seek to establish the
proposed residence. 03 Courts have unanimously held municipalities
to the forty day statute. of limitations.'04 The Appellate Division of
the New York State Supreme Court, Fourth Department, correctly
N.Y.S.2d 399 (2d Dep't 1980), where courts dismissed objections made by mu-
nicipalities to community residence sites where the municipalities failed to dem-
onstrate at a fact-finding hearing that the proposed community residence would
substantially alter the area.
100. See Town of Mount Pleasant v. State of New York Office of Mental
Retardation and Developmental Disabilities, No. 21747/82 (Sup. Ct. Westchester
County 1983); Village of Painted Post v. Slezak, No. 47424 (Sup. Ct. Steuben
County 1982); Lincoln Assocs. v. Introne, No. 24653/80 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County
1981); Town of Hempstead v. Comm'r, No. 6891/80 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County
1980) (where municipalities or neighborhood groups involved failed to even allege
that proposed residence would create overconcentration of residences that would
substantially alter area).
101. Since the opponents to a community residence are neither persons to reside
in the residence nor their representatives, it is hard to imagine how neighbors,
homeowners or municipalities would have standing to complain that a community
residence site would be unsafe for the proposed residents. The Commissioner, of
course, would have the power to deny an operating certificate if he believes a
residence would not be safe. N.Y. MENTAL Hyo. LAW §§ 31.02, 31.05 (McKinney
1978 & Supp. 1984-1985). A residence must comply with the safety features outlined
in 14 N.Y.C.R.R. § 586 (Office of Mental Health) or 14 N.Y.C.R.R. § 686 (Office
of Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities) before a license can be
issued. N.Y. ADMIN. CODE tit. 14, §§ 586, 686 (1983-1984).
102. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 41.34(c)(1)(C), (c)(5) (McKinney Supp. 1984-
1985). Town of Hempstead v. Comm'r, 89 A.D.2d 850, 453 N.Y.S.2d 32 (2d Dep't
1982); Grasmere Homeowners' Ass'n v. Introne, 84 A.D.2d 778, 443 N.Y.S.2d 956
(2d Dep't 1981).
103. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 41.34(c)(1)(C), (c)(3) (McKinney Supp. 1984-1985).
104. City of Oswego v. Prevost, 91 A.D.2d 848, 458 N.Y.S.2d 414 (4th Dep't
1982), appeal dismissed, 58 N.Y.2d 1033, 448 N.E.2d 1354, 462 N.Y.S.2d 443
(1983); Town of Stony Point v. New York Office of Mental Retardation and
Developmental Disabilities, 78 A.D.2d 858, 432 N.Y.S.2d 633 (2d Dep't 1980);
Town of Oyster Bay v. New York Office of Mental Retardation and Developmental
Disabilities, No. 13767/84 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1984); City of Fulton v. Prevost,
No. 79-1451 (Sup.. Ct. Oswego County 1979). A sponsoring agency can give a
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noted that "prejudice and cost to the agency inevitably increase with
delay.", 05
However, if the municipality suggests an alternate site that is
satisfactory as to the nature, size and community support require-
ments of the proposed residence and the area in which the site is
located does not already contain an overconcentration of similar
facilities, 0 6 the sponsoring agency must establish its residence at the
site suggested by the municipality. 107 Considering that the agency
must have a specific site in mind to commence the Padavan pro-
cedures and may have to purchase the specific site or an option to
keep the site available prior to the conclusion of the Padavan
procedures, 0 s the statutory provision requiring a sponsoring agency
to take the municipality's site if satisfactory may force sponsoring
agencies to finance two houses for the purpose of establishing one
residence. On the other hand, a sponsoring agency may be reluctant
to purchase and develop a site for fear that it may be forced to
purchase the municipality's suggested site. Thus, the statutory man-
date that a sponsoring agency take the municipality's suggested site
if suitable does not facilitate the development of community resi-
dences.
Where the suggested site is not satisfactory to the sponsoring
agency, it must notify the municipality, which will have fifteen days
to suggest another suitable site. 0 9 One court has held correctly that
the municipality can only suggest one alternative site after its initial
suggested site is rejected because a municipality should not be per-
mitted to name site after site to delay the establishment of a res-
municipality an extension of the forty-day period. See Birch Lane Ad Hoc Committee
v. Slezak, No. 3159/82 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1982), aff'd, 97 A.D.2d 985,
469 N.Y.S.2d 829 (4th Dep't 1983).
105. City of Oswego v. Prevost, 91 A.D.2d 848, 849, 458 N.Y.S.2d 414, 415
(4th Dep't 1982), appeal dismissed, 58 N.Y.2d 1033, 448 N.E.2d 1354, 462 N.Y.S.2d
443 (1983).
106. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 41.34(c)(4) (McKinney Supp. 1984-1985).
107. Id. See Talercio v. Letchworth Village Developmental Disabilities Servs.
Office, No. 738/83 (Sup. Ct. Orange County 1984), in which the court held that
a sponsoring agency was required by the statute to establish a community residence
at a satisfactory site proposed by a municipality.
108. See supra note 84.
109. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 41.34(c)(4) (McKinney Supp. 1984-1985). A
hearing pursuant to Mental Hygiene Law § 41.34(c)(5) may be scheduled during
this period to take place after the fifteen-day period has expired. Community Bd.
No. 3 v. New York Office of Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities,




idence." 0 This approach is consistent with the stated aims of the
statute.''
4. Hearing
If the municipality objects that the establishment of a residence
would result in a concentration of community residences and similar
facilities creating a substantial alteration of the area,12 or if the
sponsoring agency and the municipality cannot agree on a site," 3
either party may request an immediate hearing before the
commissioner"4 to resolve the issue." 5 While the statute dictates that
the commissioner "shall personally or by a hearing officer conduct
such a hearing within fifteen days of such a request,"' 6.one court
110. Birch Lane Ad Hoc Committee v. Slezak No. 3159/82, (Sup. Ct. Monroe
County 1982), aff'd, 97 A.D.2d 985, 469 N.Y.S.2d 829 (4th Dep't 1983). The
lower court in this case correctly recognized the tactics of the municipality stating
that the municipality's interpretation of the statute "would enable any municipality
to hamstring, at will, the efforts of the sponsoring agency, a result plainly contrary
to the purpose of Mental Hygiene Law § 41.34." Id. slip op. at 6.
111. See supra notes 50-60 and accompanying text.
112. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 41.34(c)(5) (McKinney Supp. 1984-1985).
113. Id.
114. Id. The hearing would be held either before the Commissioner of the Office
of Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities for a residence for mentally
retarded, developmentally disabled, or autistic persons or before the Commissioner
of the Office of Mental Health for a residence for mentally ill persons. Id.
115. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 41.34(c)(5) (McKinney Supp. 1984-1985). It is
hard to imagine why a municipality opposing a community residence site would
want to request a hearing, as a community residence cannot be established where
there is an objection unless a hearing is held and the Commissioner rules in favor
of the sponsoring agency. If a municipality does not object to a community residence
site, no hearing need be held and the Commissioner does not have to make findings
on the issue of substantial alteration. Dunleavy v. Introne, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 5, 1981,
at 13, col. I (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1981).
116. N.Y. MENTAL Hvo. LAW. § 41.34(c)(5) (McKinney Supp. 1984-1985). Even
if the State is the sponsoring agency as it is statutorily permitted to be, id. §
41.34(a)(2) (McKinney Supp. 1984-1985), there should be no reason why the Com-
missioner should disqualify himself as hearing officer as in administrative hearings,
an agency will serve as both the applicant and the hearing officer, or the prosecutor
and the hearing officer, without legal infirmity. See Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S.
35, 55 (1975); Sharkey v. Thurston, 268 N.Y. 123, 128, 196 N.E. 766, 768 (1935);
Amos v. Bd. of Educ., 54 A.D.2d 297, 304, 388 N.Y.S.2d 435, 440 (4th Dep't
1976), aff'd, 43 N.Y.2d 706, 372 N.E.2d 41, 401 N.Y.S.2d 207 (1977); Felin Assocs.
Inc. v. Altman, 41 A.D.2d 825, 342 N.Y.S.2d 752 (ist Dep't 1973), aff'd, 34
N.Y.2d 895, 316 N.E.2d 718, 359 N.Y.S.2d 283 (1974). As the court of appeals
said in Sharkey, "when the statute clearly requires the hearing to be held before
a designated administrative officer and no other officer can hold the hearing, then
the language of the statute may not be disregarded, nor the legislative intent
defeated by holding that the officer is disqualified." 268 N.Y. at 128, 196 N.E.
at 768.
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has held that a hearing held more than fifteen days after a request
is not invalid. ' 7
At the hearing, the burden of proof is on the municipality to
show that the establishment of the proposed facility would create
an overconcentration of residences resulting in the substantial al-
teration of the area." 8 The Padavan Law neither defines "substantial
alteration""19 nor mandates a distance limit between residences or
quotas for the number of mentally disabled persons that can live
in a municipality. While the lack of a definition for the term
"substantial alteration" may lead to more litigation, the Padavan
Law's approach is preferable to those employed elsewhere. 20 A
distance limit between residences without regard to the topography
or nature of an area is arbitrary, and the notion that a quota can
be placed on the numbers of a certain type of person to live in an
area is abhorrent and probably unconstitutional.' 2' The "substantial
alteration" standard is of benefit to both communities and to men-
tally disabled persons, who may not benefit from living in a sub-
stantially altered area,12 and it is reasonable to let the courts decide,
117. See, e.g., Town of Pleasant Valley v. Wassaic Developmental Disabilities
Servs. Office, 92 A.D.2d 543, 459 N.Y.S.2d 109 (2d Dep't 1983).
118. Town of Hempstead v. Commissioner, 89 A.D.2d 850, 851, 453 N.Y.S.2d
32, 33 (2d Dep't 1982); Grasmere Homeowners' Ass'n v. Introne, 84 A.D.2d 778,
779, 443 N.Y.S.2d 956, 957 (2d Dep't 1981). The municipality must prove its case
with evidence of a "concrete and of a convincing nature." Id. at 779, 443 N.Y.S.2d
at 957. Conclusory allegations cannot sustain a municipality's objections. See id.;
Town of Hempstead v. Comm'r, 78 A.D.2d 677, 432 N.Y.S.2d 399 (2d Dep't
1980); Town of Greenburgh v. Coughlin, 73 A.D.2d 672, 423 N.Y.S.2d 209 (2d
Dep't 1979), Iv. to appeal denied, 49 N.Y.2d 704, 404 N.E.2d 1341, 427 N.Y.S.2d
1025 (1980). Placing the burden of proof on the objecting municipality is consistent
with New York State's Administrative Procedure Act § 306 which places the burden
on the party initiating the hearing. 1975 N.Y. Laws ch. 167, § 1. Were it not for
the objection of the municipality, the sponsoring agency would be free to establish
the community residence without a hearing. See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW §
41.34(c)(1)(C), (c)(3) (McKinney Supp. 1984-1985).
119. See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 41.34(c)(5) (McKinney Supp. 1984-1985).
120. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 245.812(a) (West 1982), which states:
Under no circumstances may the commissioner newly license any group
residential facility pursuant to sections 245.781 to 245.812 and 252.28,
subdivision 2 if such residential facility will be within 1,320 feet of any
existing group residential facility unless the appropriate town, municipality
or county zoning authority grants the facility a conditional use or special
use permit.
Id.
121. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), which found un-
constitutional state statutes whose aim were to deter indigents from settling within
the states' boundaries.
122. See SITE SELECTION STUDY supra note 7, at 26-27.
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based on the record of a fact-finding hearing, whether an area would
be substantially altered by a residence.1 3
5. Determination
In reviewing a municipality's objections to a community residence,
the commissioner must consider "the. need for such facilities in the
municipality." 1 24 However, a municipality's objections cannot be
sustained solely on the ground that no need was shown at the
hearing. 25 Although some municipalities have argued that the need
must exist in the specific municipality, the Appellate Division of the
New York State Supreme Court, Second Department, has correctly
held that a showing of need in the general community as opposed
to the smaller municipality is sufficient. 126 This interpretation is
logical-any other reading of the statute would discourage the es-
tablishment of residences in smaller municipalities and, with regard
to small incorporated villages and New York City where the relevant
municipality is the local community board,'27 would require spon-
soring agencies to engage in detailed, unnecessary record-keeping to
determine the precise "municipality" in which each prospective res-
ident lives. Additionally, this requirement would make it more dif-
ficult for sponsoring agencies seeking to establish community residences
for persons afflicted with rarer forms of mental disabilities and
would not promote the avoidance of a disproportionate distribution
of community residences.
In determining whether an area would be substantially altered,
the commissioner must consider the existing 2 1 concentration of com-
munity residences, similar residences licensed by other state
123. The constitutionality of this portion of the Padavan Law was upheld against
a municipality's challenge that the standard was too vague. Incorporated Village
of Old Field v. Introne, 104 Misc. 2d 122, 124, 430 N.Y.S.2d 192, 194 (Sup. Ct.
Suffolk County 1980).
124. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 41.34(c)(5) (McKinney Supp. 1984-1985); see
Town of Hempstead v. Comm'r, 97 A.D.2d 826, 468 N.Y.S.2d 710 (2d Dep't
1983).
125. Town of Pound Ridge v. Introne, 81 A.D.2d 890, 890, 439 N.Y.S.2d 54,
55 (2d Dep't 1981).
126. Id. at 890, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 55. In Town of Pound Ridge, the court held
that a showing of need for the entire Westchester County was sufficient for showing
that there was a need for this residence in Pound Ridge, a town in Westchester
County. Id.
127. See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 41.34(a)(3) (McKinney Supp. 1984-1985).
128. Roberts v. Selzak, 89 A.D.2d 559, 452 N.Y.S.2d 113 (2d Dep't 1982) (court
held that commissioner did not have to consider facility that was being planned
but was not in operation).
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agencies' 29 and any other facilities in proximity to the site selected
which provide residential services to a significant number of persons
who formerly have received in-patient services in facilities operated
by the Office of Mental Health or the Office of Mental Retardation
and Developmental Disabilities. 30 Several courts have decided which
"similar residences" must be considered by the commissioner.'' The
Appellate Division of the New York State Supreme Court, Fourth
Department, has held that only residences for four to fourteen per-
sons must be considered.' 32 The second department, however, has held
that a family care home for three persons must be considered by the
commissioner since such home was a "community residence" as
defined by the Social Services Law.' Recently, the second depart-
ment has held that a nursing home and a health-related facility hous-
ing over 100 persons were not "similar facilities" and did not have
to the considered by the commissioner."3 The approach of the second
department appears to be more logical, and the fourth department
probably now would concur with the approach of its sister court,
since the 1982 amendments to the Padavan Law apply the statutory
procedures to residences housing one to three persons.
The commissioner can sustain a municipality's objection only if
he determines that the nature and character of the area in which
the facility is to be located would be substantially altered as a result
of the establishment of the residence.'35 While the statute states that
"the commissioner shall make a determination within thirty days of
the hearing," courts have held that determinations made more than
129. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 41.34(c)(5) (McKinney Supp. 1984-1985).
130. Id.
131. Town of Hempstead v. Comm'r, 97 A.D.2d 826, 468 N.Y.S.2d 710 (2d
Dep't 1983); Spielman v. Introne, 88 A.D.2d 958, 451 N.Y.S.2d 194 (2d Dep't
1982); Village of Newark v. Introne, 84 A.D.2d 936, 446 N.Y.S.2d 689 (4th Dep't
1981); Town of Onondaga v. Introne, 81 A.D.2d 750, 438 N.Y.S.2d 407 (4th Dep't
1981).
132. Village of Newark v. Introne, 84 A.D.2d 936, 937, 446 N.Y.S.2d 689, 690
(4th Dep't 1981). In Town of Onondaga v. Introne, 81 A.D.2d 750, 438 N.Y.S.2d
407 (4th Dep't 1981), the appellate division held that a hospital and a juvenile
detention center did not have to be considered by the commissioner in determining
overconcentration. Id.
133. Spielman v. Introne, 88 A.D.2d 958, 451 N.Y.S.2d 194 (2d Dep't 1982);
N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 463 (McKinney 1983).
134. Town of Hempstead v. Comm'r, 97 A.D.2d 826, 468 N.Y.S.2d 710 (2d
*Dep't 1983).
135. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 41.34(c)(5) (McKinney Supp. 1984-1985); see,
e.g., Town of Hempstead v. Comm'r, 78 A.D.2d 677, 432 N.Y.S.2d 399 (2d Dep't
1980); Town of Greenburgh v. Coughlin, 73 A.D.2d 672, 423 N.Y.S.2d 209 (2d




thirty days after the hearing are valid.3 6 Municipalities objecting to
community residence sites are not prejudiced by a tardy determination
since a community residence cannot be established until the com-
missioner has rendered a determination in favor of the residence.'37
6. Review
The Padavan Law states that "[r]eview of a decision rendered by
a commissioner pursuant to this section may be had in a proceeding
pursuant to article seventy-eight of the [C]ivil [P]ractice [L]aw and
[R]ules [CPLR] commenced within thirty days of the determination
of the commissioner.''13 Since the statute of limitations for chal-
lenging other governmental determinations pursuant to article sev-
enty-eight is four months, 3 9 the shortened statute of limitations
appears to be aimed at expediting litigation challenging community
residences. However, since proceedings challenging decisions rendered
by a commissioner as not based upon substantial evidence must be
transferred to the appellate division' 4° and a petitioner has up to
136. Town of Pleasant Valley v. Wassaic Developmental Disabilities Servs. Offices,
92 A.D.2d 543, 544, 459 N.Y.S.2d 109, 112 (2d Dep't 1983) (determination was
one day late); Incorporated Village of Old Field v. Introne, No. 80-1830 (Sup. Ct.
Suffolk County 1980) (determination rendered after statutory period had expired).
137. See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 41.34(e) (McKinney Supp. 1984-1985) (res-
idences cannot be established until compliance with Padavan Law procedures).
138. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 41.34(d) (McKinney Supp. 1984-1985); see Kayser
v. Introne, No. 27611/79 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1980), aff'd, 80 A.D.2d 751,
436 N.Y.S. 905 (2d Dep't 1981).
139. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 217 (McKinney 1971); see Community Board No. 3 v.
New York Office of Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities, 76 A.D.2d
851, 428 N.Y.S.2d 520 (2d Dep't 1980), appeal dismissed, 53 N.Y.2d 839
(1981);(determination challenged was actual operating license granted by Commis-
sioner), Town of Mount Pleasant v. State of New York Office of Mental Retardation
and Developmental Disabilities, No. 21747/82 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1983)
(challenges to various procedural determinations made by commissioner during
Padavan Law procedures subjected to four-month statute of limitations of CPLR
§ 217); Romita v. New York State Office of Mental Retardation, No. 4537/82,
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1982) (determination challenged was decision to open residence
without hearing).
The doctrine of laches has also been applied against municipalities and homeowners
who delay their objections about Padavan law procedures. See Community Board
No. 3 v. New York Office of Mental Retardation and Development Disabilities, 76
A.D.2d 851, 853, 428 N.Y.S.2d 520, 522 (2d Dep't 1980), appeal dismissed, 53 N.Y.2d
839 (1981); Zureck v. New York State Office of Mental Retardation and Developmen-
tal Disabilities, No. 939/85 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1985); Town of Webster v.
Slezak, No. 1993/82, (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1982); Brennan v. Office of Mental
Retardation and Developmental Disabilities of the State of New York, No. 21697/81
(Sup. Ct. Warren County 1981).
140. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. §§ 7803(4), 7804(g) (McKinney 1981 & Supp. 1984-1985).
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nine months in some appellate divisions to perfect a transferred
proceeding, 4' the shortened statute of limitations does not expedite
proceedings against community residences. A more serious defect in
the review section of the Padavan procedures is its failure to include
the words "by the municipality" after "[r]eview of a decision ren-
dered by a commissioner pursuant to this section may be had ....
This omission has opened the door to many neighbors and home-
owner groups challenging the decisions of the commissioner even
where the municipality has not challenged said decision. 43 To date,
no commissioner's determination that a community residence site
was appropriate has been challenged successfully in an article seventy-
eight proceeding. 144
C. Zoning and Other Local Ordinances
One of the few benefits of the statute to sponsoring agencies is
that a community residence established pursuant to the Padavan
Law is deemed a family unit for the purpose of local laws and
ordinances. 45 However, this benefit was bestowed upon community
141. 22 N.Y.C.R.R. § 600.11(a)(3) (nine months in First Department); 22
N.Y.C.R.R. § 670.13(c), 670.20(f) (nine months in Second Department).
142. See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 41.34(d) (McKinney Supp. 1984-1985).
143. See infra notes 195-216 and accompanying text.
144. See Town of Hempstead v. Comm'r, 97 A.D.2d 826, 468 N.Y.S.2d
710 (2d Dep't 1983); Incorporated Village of Westbury v. Prevost, 96 A.D.2d 1100,
467 N.Y.S.2d 70 (2d Dep't 1983); Town of Pleasant Valley v. Wassaic Developmental
Disabilities Servs. Office, 92 A.D.2d 543, 459 N.Y.S.2d 109 (2d Dep't 1983); Town
of Hempstead v. Comm'r, 89 A.D.2d 850, 453 N.Y.S.2d 32 (2d Dep't 1982);
Village of Newark v. Introne, 84 A.D.2d 936, 446 N.Y.S.2d 689 (4th Dep't 1981);
Grasmere Homeowners Ass'n v. Introne, 84 A.D.2d 778, 443 N.Y.S.2d 956 (2d
Dep't 1981); Community Planning Bd. No. 18 v. Introne, 84 A.D.2d 564, 443
N.Y.S.2d 262 (2d Dep't 1981); Incorporated Village of Old Field v. Introne, 81
A.D.2d 906, 441 N.Y.S.2d 418 (2d Dep't 1981); Town of Onondaga v. Introne,
81 A.D.2d 750, 438 N.Y.S.2d 407 (4th Dep't 1981); Town of Pound Ridge v.
Introne, 81 A.D.2d 890, 439 N.Y.S.2d 54 (2d Dep't 1981); Town of Cortlandt v.
New York Office of Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities, 80 A.D.2d
648, 436 N.Y.S.2d 1013 (2d Dep't 1981); Town of Hempstead v. Commissioner,
78 A.D.2d 677, 432 N.Y.S.2d 399 (2d Dep't 1980); Lake Hawthorne Homeowners
Ass'n, Inc. v. Coughlin, 75 A.D.2d 855, 432 N.Y.S.2d 154 (2d Dep't 1980), Iv.
to appeal denied, 52 N.Y.2d 703, 437 N.Y.S.2d 1026 (1981); City of Schenectady
v. Coughlin, 74 A.D.2d 985, 426 N.Y.S.2d 328 (3d Dep't 1980); Town of Greenburgh
v. Coughlin, 73 A.D.2d 672, 423 N.Y.S.2d 209 (2d Dep't 1979), lv. to appeal
denied, 49 N.Y.2d 704, 404 N.E.2d 1341, 427 N.Y.S.2d 1025 (1980); Birch Lane
Ad Hoc Committee v. Slezak, No. 3159/82 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1982), aff'd,
97 A.D.2d 985, 469 N.Y.S.2d 829 (4th Dep't 1983).
145. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 41.34(f) (McKinney Supp. 1984-1985). This
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statute is consistent with statutes in other states. See supra note 60.
Several law review articles have been written on this topic. See Boyd, Strategies
in Zoning and Community Living Arrangements for Retarded Citizens: Parens
Patriae Meets Police Powers, 25 VILL. L. REV. 273 (1980); Hopperton, State
Legislative Strategy for Ending Exclusionary Zoning of Community Homes, 19
URB. L. ANN. 47 (1980); Kressel, The Community Residence Movement: Land Use
Conflicts & Planning Imperatives, 5 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 137 (1975);
Lippincott, "A Sanctuary for People": Strategies for Overcoming Zoning Restric-
tions on Community Houses for Retarded Persons, 31 STAN. L. REV. 767 (1979);
Tuoni, Deinstitutionalization and Community Resistance by Zoning Restrictions, 66
MASS. L. REV. 125 (1981); Note, Zoning the Mentally Retarded into Single-Family
Residential Areas: A Grape of Wrath or the Fermentation of Wisdom, 1979 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 385; Note, Zoning for the Mentally Ill: A Legislative Mandate, 16 HARV.
J. LEGIS. 853 (1979); Note, Exclusionary Zoning of Community Facilities, 12 N.C.
CENTRAL L.J. 167 (1980); Note, Zoning and Community Group Homes for the
Mentally Retarded-Boon or Bust?, 7 OHIO N.U.L. REV. 64 (1980); NOTE, A
Review of the Conflict Between Community-Based Group Homes for the Mentally
Retarded and Restrictive Zoning, 82 W. VA. L. REV. 669 (1980). Decisions of
other state courts have held that local zoning ordinances could not be used to
block the establishment of community residences. See Glennon Heights, Inc. v.
Central Bank & Trust, 658 P.2d 872 (Colo. 1983); Hessling v. City of Broomfield,
193 Colo. 124, 563 P.2d 12 (1977); Oliver v. Zoning Comm'n, 31 Conn. Supp.
197, 326 A.2d 841 (1974); Linn County v. City of Hiawatha, 311 N.W.2d 95 (Iowa
1981); Tucker v. Special Children's Found., Inc., 449 So. 2d 45 (La. Ct. App.
1984); City of West Monroe v. Ouachita Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc., 402
So. 2d 259 (La. Ct. App. 1981); Fitchburg Housing Auth. v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals
of Fitchburg, 380 Mass. 869, 406 N.E.2d 1006 (1980); Northwest Residence, Inc.
v. City of Brooklyn Center, 352 N.W.2d 764 (Minn. 1984); Costley v. Caromin
House, 313 N.W.2d 21 (Minn. 1981); Northern N.H. Mental Health Housing, Inc.
v. Town of Conway, 121 N.H. 811, 435 A.2d 136 (1981); Region 10 Client
Management, Inc. v. Town of Hampstead, 120 N.H. 885, 424 A.2d 207 (1980);
Berger v. State, 71 N.J. 206, 364 A.2d 993 (1976); Mental Health Ass'n of Union
County, Inc. v. City of Elizabeth, 180 N.J. Super. 304, 434 A.2d 688 (N.J. 1981);
Mongony v. Bevilacqua, 432 A.2d 661 (R.I. 1981); Nichols v. Tullahoma Open
Door, Inc., 640 S.W.2d 13 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1982); cf. Civitans Care, Inc. v. Board
of Adjustment of Huntsville, 437 So. 2d 540 (Ala. Civ. App. 1983) (court held
community residence was "boarding house" and not permissible in neighborhood
zoned for family-only occupancy); Roundup Found., Inc. v. Bd. of Adjustment
of Denver, 626 P.2d 1154 (Colo. App. 1981) (operation of group home for mentally
retarded children not permitted use in R-2 zoned district); Macon Ass'n for Retarded
Citizens v. Macon-Bibb County Planning and Zoning Comm'n, 252 Ga. 484, 314
S.E.2d 218 (1984) (refusal to permit group home in single-family zoning district
held not to constitute unconstitutional discrimination against mentally retarded);
Metropolitan Dev. Comm'n of Marion County v. The Villages, Inc., 464 N.E.2d
367 (Ind. App. 1984) (proposed group home did not qualify as single-family dwelling
or accessory use under zoning ordinance); Penobscot Area Housing Dev. Corp. v.
City of Brewer, 434 A.2d 14 (Me. 1981) (group home did not constitute single-
family use under zoning ordinance); Garcia v. Siffrin Residential Ass'n, 63 Ohio
St. 2d 259, 407 N.E.2d 1369 (1980) (state statute purporting to override local zoning
ordinances and allow community residential facilities in residential districts held
invalid).
In Cleburne Living Center, Inc. v. City of Cleburne, Texas, 726 F.2d 191 (5th
Cir. 1984), the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a zoning ordinance excluding
community residences from use in an "apartment house district" was unconsti-
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residences by the courts prior to the enactment of the statute. 46
Despite the clarity of the statute, some municipalities have attempted
unsuccessfully to apply institutional codes to community residences.
47
Similarly, attempts to declare this section of the statute unconsti-
tutional have been unsuccessful.' 4 8
Non-governmental private sponsoring agencies still must follow
the single-family ordinances of the local municipality before estab-
lishing community residences. 49 However, where the state or a state
tutional. Cleburne, 726 F.2d at 201. The Supreme Court of the United States af-
firmed the fifth circuit's order on July 1, 1985.
146. See supra note 38. However, those community residence cases involved a
family model of houseparents and residents. It is not as clear that community
residences without houseparents would have been deemed single family units for
the purpose of local zoning laws prior to the Padavan Law. See Crane Neck Ass'n
v. NYC/Long Island County Servs. Group, 61 N.Y.2d 154, 159-60, 460 N.E.2d
1336, 1338-39, 472 N.Y.S.2d 901, 904, cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 60 (1984).
147. Talercio v. Letchworth Village Developmental Disabilities Servs. Office, No.
738/83 (Sup. Ct. Orange County 1984); Town of Greenburgh v. Introne, No.
11996/81 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1982); New Vistas of Rockland v. Greenblatt,
No. 4957/81, (Sup. Ct. Rockland County 1982); Dunleavy v. Introne, N.Y.L.J.,
Aug. 5, 1981, at 13, col. 1 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1981).
In a similar vein, courts have rejected challenges by objectants to community
residences claiming that community residence sponsors should be forced to file
environmental impact statements or comply with Environmental Conservation Law
§§ 8-0101 to -0117 and the environmental regulations of the State of New York.
See N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. L. §§ 8-0101 to -0117 (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1984-
1985), N.Y. ADMIN. CODE tit. 6, §§ 617-617.19 (1978-1984). Pursuant to the
regulations, specifically N.Y. ADMIN. CODE tit. 14, § 52.14 (Type 11)(h), the
Commissioner has determined that such residences are "Type I1" actions requiring
no environmental review and the courts have upheld this determination. Brennan
v. Office of Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities of New York, No.
21697/81 (Sup. Ct. Warren County 1981), Town of Pleasant Valley v. Wassaic
Developmental Disabilities Servs. Office, No. 2983-82 (Sup. Ct. Dutchess County
1983). Since other single family dwellings need not engage in environmental review
before settling into a community, the commissioner's determination and the court
decisions upholding it are logical. It should be noted that projects on a much
grander scale than community residences have required little environmental review
more than a commissioner's determination that the project is not of environmental
significance. See Town of Yorktown v. New York State Dep't of Mental Hygiene,
92 A.D.2d 897, 898, 459 N.Y.S.2d 891, 892 (2d Dep't), aff'd, 59 N.Y.2d 999, 453
N.E.2d 1254, 466 N.Y.S.2d 965 (1983) (drug rehabilitation facility for 300 persons);
Cohalan v. Carey, 88 A.D.2d 77, 452 N.Y.S.2d 639 (2d Dep't), Iv. to appeal denied,
57 N.Y.2d 672, 439 N.E.2d 886, 454 N.Y.S.2d 77 (1982) (establishment of prison);
Harlem Valley United Coalition v. Hall, 80 A.D.2d 851, 436 N.Y.S.2d 764 (2d Dept),
aff'd, 54 N.Y.2d 977, 430 N.E.2d 909, 446 N.Y.S.2d 33 (1981) (center for delinquents).
148. See infra notes 153-82 and accompanying text.
149. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 41.34(f) (McKinney Supp. 1984-1985); N.Y.
ADMIN. CODE tit. 14. . 586. 686: 1979 Attorney General's Opinion 138-40.
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As stated in the Declaration15' and the Governor's Memorandum, 152
the Padavan Law was intended to facilitate development of com-
munity residences and deinstitutionalization and to recognize the
community concerns regarding such residences. 53 However, munic-
ipalities, neighbors of prospective residences, and sponsoring agencies
all have expressed dissatisfaction with the statute and have urged
the courts to declare the statute unconstitutional.1 4 On every oc-
casion, the courts have upheld the constitutionality of the statute.
In Incorporated Village of Old Field v. Introne,'"1 a municipality
tried to have the statute declared invalid as an unconstitutional
delegation of power by the legislature, as void for vagueness, as
violative of the village's "right to due process and equal protection
of the laws" and as disregarding the village's zoning ordinance.' 5 6
The New York State Supreme Court, Suffolk County, rejected
the village's challenge to the statute on all grounds. The court first
held that the village did not have standing to challenge the statute,
citing cases which held that certain types of managerial and dis-
cretionary government decisions cannot be reviewed by a court.' 57
However, the cases relied on by the court were mandamus proceedings
and not challenges to the constitutionality of statutes.'58 In actuality,
the municipality had no standing to challenge the constitutionality
150. Town of Pleasant Valley v. Wassaic Developmental Disabilities Servs. Office,
No. 2983-82 (Sup. Ct. Dutchess County 1983); Town of Greenburgh v. Introne,
No. 11996/81, slip op. at 3 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1982); Gedney Ass'n
v. New York State Dep't of Mental Hygiene, 112 Misc. 2d 209, 213, 446 N.Y.S.2d
876 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1982); see also County of Westchester v. Village
of Mamaroneck, 22 A.D.2d 143, 255 N.Y.S.2d 290 (2d Dep't 1964), aff'd, 16 N.Y.2d
940, 212 N.E.2d 442, 264 N.Y.S.2d 925 (1965) (county sewage project exempt from
zoning restrictions of village in which project located); Incorporated Village
of Old Field v. Introne, 104 Misc. 2d 122, 127, 430 N.Y.S.2d 192, 196 (Sup. Ct.
Suffolk County 1980) (local zoning ordinance which conflicts with and hinders
state policy is void).
151. See supra notes 53-57.
152. See supra notes 58-60.
153. 1978 N.Y. Laws ch. 468, § 1; 1978 McKinney's Sess. Laws at 1821-22.
154. See infra notes 155-95 and accompanying text.
155. 104 Misc. 2d 122, 430 N.Y.S.2d 192 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1980).
156. Id. at 123-24, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 194.
157. Id.
158. Id. More specifically, the court cited Abrams v. New York City Transit
Auth., 39 N.Y.2d 990, 355 N.E.2d 289, 387 N.Y.S.2d 235 (1976), and Jones v.
1985]
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of the statute except the zoning provisions which the municipality
could claim impinged upon its rights under the "home rule" pro-
visions of the New York State Constitution.'5 9 Thus, the court reached
the right conclusion with regard to the municipality's lack of standing
for the wrong reasons.
In discarding the village's claim that the statute was an uncon-
stitutional delegation of power because it lacked standards and criteria
for determining what constitutes "substantial alteration," the court
noted that the legislature was not required to furnish a "precise or
specific formula"' '6 but only had to "[lay] down 'an intelligible
principle,' specifying the standards or guides in as detailed a fashion
as is reasonably practicable in the light of the complexities of the
particular area to be regulated." '' 6' The court held that the standards
to be applied by the commissioner in reviewing a municipality's
objections to a community residence site were sufficiently specific
in light of the standards imposed by other statutes that withstood
vagueness challenges. 62 The court also rejected the village's allegation
that it was denied due process and equal protection, 63 properly
questioning whether these concepts applied to municipal corporations
and noting that a municipality had no right to object to a community
residence site proposed prior to enactment of the statute.' 64
Finally, the court correctly held that the Padavan Law superseded
the local village ordinances, noting that the state's police power can
be invoked to override local ordinances where a subject of substantial
state concern, 65 such as the care of mentally disabled persons in
the state, is involved.1 66 The court also noted that the state, as
Beame, 45 N.Y.2d 402, 408, 380 N.E.2d 277, 408 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1978), two cases
that involved challenges to policies of municipalities and not the constitutionality
of any statute.
159. See Williams v. Mayor, 289 U.S. 36, 40 (1933); City of New York v.
Richardson, 473 F.2d 923, 929 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 950 (1973); Town
of Black Brook v. State, 41 N.Y.2d 486, 362 N.E.2d 576, 393 N.Y.S.2d 946 (1977);
Jeter v. Ellenville Cent. School Dist., 41 N.Y.2d 283; 360 N.E.2d 1086, 392 N.Y.S.2d
403 (1977); Wambat Realty Corp. v. State, 41 N.Y.2d 490, 362 N.E.2d 581, 393
N.Y.S.2d 949 (1977).
160. Incorporated Village of Old Field v. Introne, 104 Misc. 2d 122, 125, 430
N.Y.S.2d 192, 195 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1980).
161. Id.
162. Id. The court noted that statutory standards such as "public interest,
convenience or necessity," "public peace, safety and good order" and "public
health, safety and general welfare" have been upheld against vagueness challenges.
Id.
163. Id. at 126-27, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 195-96.
164. Id. at 126, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 195.
165. Id. at 127, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 196.
166. See 104 Misc. 2d at 127, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 196.
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sponsoring agent of the residence in question, was free from local
control under the doctrine of sovereign immunity. 67 Several other
challenges to the statute by municipalities also have been summarily
dismissed. 168
In Zubli v. Community Mainstreaming Associates, Inc. ,169 the next-
door neighbor of a proposed community residence in Kings Point
brought an action to enjoin the establishment of the community
residence and to declare the Padavan Law unconstitutional. 70 The
neighbor alleged that the enactment of the Padavan Law was an
unconstitutional zoning change since affected owners did not receive
notice and a public hearing.' 7 ' Additionally, the neighbor alleged
that the Padavan Law was an unreasonable exercise of the state's
police power. 17 2
The decision of the New York State Supreme Court, Nassau
County, that the Padavan Law.was constitutional' 73 was upheld by
both the appellate division, second department 74 and the New York
State Court of Appeals. '71 The supreme court held that the statute
was properly enacted since, as an act of general legislation, it required
neither notice nor a public hearing to effect the change. 76 More
importantly, however, the court held that the Padavan Law was not
''an unconstitutional exercise of local zoning authority by the State"
but rather an "exercise of the State's fundamental police power for
the public good and welfare."' 77 The court found that the statute
served a legitimate state interest and was not an unreasonable exercise
of police power.'
The most intriguing constitutional challenge to the Padavan Law
was raised in DiBiase v. Piscitelli.79 What began as a simple pro-
167. Id.
168. Incorporated Village of Westbury v. Prevost, 96 A.D.2d 1100, 467 N.Y.S.2d
70 (2d Dep't 1983), appeal denied, 62 N.Y,2d 602, 465 N.E.2d 375, 496 N.Y.S.2d
1026 (1984); Cosgrove v. Introne, No. 1025/1980 (Sup. Ct. Orange County 1982);
Town of Greenburgh v. Introne, No. 11996/81 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1982).
169. 102 Misc. 2d 320, 423 N.Y.S.2d 982 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1979), aff'd
on opinion below, 74 A.D.2d 624, 425 N.Y.S.2d 263 (2d Dep't), aff'd as modified,
50 N.Y.2d 1024, 410 N.E.2d 746, 431 N.Y.S.2d 813 (1980).
170. 102 Misc. 2d at 322, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 985.
171. Id. at 331-33, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 991-92.
172. Id. at 337, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 994.
173. Id. at 335, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 993.
174. 74 A.D.2d 624, 425 N.Y.S.2d 263 (2d Dep't 1980).
175. 50 N.Y.2d 1024, 410 N.E.2d 746, 431 N.Y.S.2d 813 (1980).
176. 102 Misc. 2d at 333, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 992.
177. Id, at 335, 339, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 993.
178. Id.
179. N.Y.L.J., July 14, 1980, at 14, col. 4 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1980),
aff'd, 87 A.D.2d 611, 448 N.Y.S.2d 35 (2d Dep't 1982), appeal dismissed, 57
N.Y.2d 672, 439 N.E.2d 1248, 454 N.Y.S.2d 1034 (1982).
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ceeding by a group of neighbors in Westbury, to challenge the
decision of a sponsoring agency to establish a community residence
and the decision of the village approving the selection of the proposed
residence, became an attack on the constitutionality of the statute
by both the neighbors and the sponsoring agency.'80 The New York
State Supreme Court, Nassau County, dismissed the neighbors' attack
on the Padavan Law on the ground that they did not have standing
to challenge the statute.'"' This result seems inconsistent with Zubli's
implicit holding that neighbors do have standing to challenge the
statute. However, since the constitutional challenges raised by the
neighbors in DiBiase were the same as those raised in Zubli, the
DiBiase court also rejected the neighbors' claims based on the Zubli
precedent. ' 82
The DiBiase court also rejected the sponsoring agency's claim that
the statute violated the equal protection clause8 3 and discriminated
against mentally retarded persons. 184 The court held that the Padavan
Law was reasonably related to the policy sought to be implemented,
the facilitation of the establishment of community residences.8 5 The
court ruled that:
The Padavan Law is not a regulatory statute that exercises
restraint or control over a person or his or her property. It merely
provides a procedure for establishing and licensing community
residential facilities for the mentally retarded. The statute does
not abridge any of the fundamental rights of the mentally retarded.
They are entitled to those same rights of travel, ownership of
property, and pursuit of life, liberty and happiness as other people
enjoy. The Padavan Law, through the exercise of the state's police
power, only seeks to open new doors to the mentally retarded
to free them from the chains of institutionalization. 86
The court, noting that mentally retarded persons do not constitute
a suspect class, 87 applied the rational basis test to the statute and
180. N.Y.L.J., July 14, 1980, at 14, col. 4.
181. Id. The court found, though, that the neighbors had standing to challenge
the determination of the village approving the sponsoring agency's proposed site.
Id.
182. Id.
183. U.S. CONST. amend XIV.
184. N.Y.L.J., July 14, 1980, at 15, col. 2.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id., see Matter of Levy v. City of New York, 38 N.Y.2d 653, 658, 345
N.E.2d 556, 558, 382 N.Y.S.2d 13, 15 (1976), appeal dismissed, 429 U.S. 805




decided that it did not violate the equal protection clause.18 The
second department affirmed the holding of the supreme court, Nassau
County,8 9 finding that
[O]n its face, . . . the challenged statute is patently designed
to encourage the establishment and licensing of community res-
idential facilities for persons formerly served in State institutions
and to insure that providers of care establish such facilities with
the participation of local communities in site selection .... By
amending the Mental Hygiene Law, the Legislature expressed a
public policy that the needs of the mentally disabled should be
met through the concept of group homes in community settings
chosen through a process of joint discussion and accommodation
between the providers of care and services to the mentally disabled
and representatives of the community. Section 41.34 of the Mental
Hygiene Law [Padavan Law] is rationally related to the public
policy sought to be implemented by the Legislature, and to that
extent, is constitutional . . . . 9
The result reached by the DiBiase court was correct since, with
respect to the community residence at issue, the statute worked as
anticipated. In DiBiase, the sponsoring agency gave the municipality
notice of the establishment of the residence, the municipality held
public hearings and eventually approved the selection of the home,
and the sponsoring agency acquired the home.' 91 Additionally, the
sponsoring agency argued in favor of the constitutionality of the
statute when it was initially attacked by the neighbors' group. 92
what differentiates sex from such nonsuspect statuses as intelligence or
physical disability, and aligns it with the recognized suspect criteria, is
that the sex characteristic frequently bears no relation to ability to perform
or contribute to society."
Id. at 686 (emphasis added).
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals recently found a local ordinance banning com-
munity residences in a particular area to be unconstitutional, and in the process,
held that the mentally retarded were a "quasi-suspect" class. Cleburne Living
Center, Inc. v. City of Cleburne, Texas, 726 F.2d 191 (5th Cir. 1984). However,
the Supreme Court of the United States on July 1, 1985 vacated the lower court's
"quasi-suspect" classification of the mentally retarded in light of its previous deci-
sion in Frontiero. The Court did affirm the circuit court's order using the rational
basis test.
188. N.Y.L.J., July 14, 1980, at 15, col. 2.
189. DiBiase v. Piscitelli, 87 A.D.2d 611, 448 N.Y.S.2d 35 (2d Dep't 1982),
appeal dismissed, 57 N.Y.2d 672, 439 N.E.2d 1248, 454 N.Y.S.2d 1034 (1982).
190. Id. at 611-12, 448 N.Y.S.2d at 36.
191. Id. A party not aggrieved by a statute cannot attack its constitutionality.
Ulster County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 154-55 (1979); Oriental Blvd. Co. v.
Heller, 27 N.Y.2d 212, 220, 265 N.E.2d 72, 75, 316 N.Y.S.2d 226, 231 (1970),
appeal dismissed, 401 U.S. 986 (1971).
192. N.Y.L.J., July 14, 1980, at 15, col. 2.
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However, the courts' findings that the statute served the purposes
enunciated by the legislature and the governor are somewhat strained
since state officials have testified that the statute has, in some
instances, impeded the development of new community residences. 93
Indeed, the state cited the statute's procedural requirements as a
reason for requesting an additional four years to comply with the
Willowbrook Consent Decree with respect to the number of persons
to be moved from Willowbrook to community residences.' 94 Perhaps
the question of whether a particular application of the statute is
rationally related to the public policy sought to be implemented by
the legislature would be a triable issue of fact in a case with
circumstances different from those in DiBiase.
E. Standing
During the 1970's, the New York State Court of Appeals developed
the "zone of interests"' 195 test of standing to increase the accessibility
of courts to aggrieved persons. 96 Under that test, a complainant
need only show that an administrative action would have a harmful
effect on him and that the interest asserted is arguably within the
zone of interests to be protected by the statute.' 97 The court of
appeals also has held that standing will be denied where a clear
legislative intent negates review or where there is no demonstration
of injury in fact.'98 Using this liberalized standing test, lower courts
have wrongfully permitted neighbors and homeowner associations
to challenge decisions on community residence sites where the mu-
nicipalities in question have acquiesced in or supported the site
selected by the sponsoring agency.
In Grasmere Homeowners' Association v. Introne, 99 two home-
owner associations challenged a commissioner's determination that
the establishment of community residences at two contested locations
in Staten Island would be appropriate since their presence would
193. See supra note 71.
194. Id.
195. Fritz v. Huntington Hosp., 39 N.Y.2d 339, 346, 348 N.E.2d 547, 553, 384
N.Y.S.2d 92, 97 (1976); Dairylea Coop., Inc. v. Walkley, 38 N.Y.2d 6, 9-10, 339
N.E.2d 865, 867, 377 N.Y.S.2d 451 (1975); Douglaston Civic Ass'n v. Galvin, 36
N.Y.2d 1, 7, 324 N.E.2d 317, 321, 364 N.Y.S.2d 830, 835 (1974).
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Fritz, 39 N.Y.2d at 339, 348 N.E.2d at 547, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 92 (doctors
had right to challenge hospital determination denying them staff membership);
Dairylea Coop., Inc., 38 N.Y.2d 6, 339 N.E.2d 865, 377 N.Y.S.2d 451 (1975) (milk
company had standing to challenge grant of license to competitor).
199. 84 A.D.2d 778, 443 N.Y.S.2d 956 (2d Dep't 1981).
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not create an overconcentration of residences resulting in the sub-
stantial alteration of their areas. 200 The municipality, Community
Board #2, did not challenge the commissioner's determination. How-
ever, the appellate division, second department held that the asso-
ciation's interests were within the "zone of interests" to be protected
by the statute and that the associations had standing to challenge
the determination. 20 1
In Karas v. New York State Office of Mental Retardation and
Developmental Disabilities,20 2 a group of residents in the vicinity of
a proposed residence and a homeowner association attempted to
enjoin establishment of the facility despite the municipality's approval
of the site. 203 The court held that although the municipality would
not be able to challenge the site, the neighbors had standing to
engage in litigation.20 4While acknowledging the liberalized standing test, 205 both the Gras-
mere Homeowners' Association and Karas courts ignored the court
of appeals' holding that standing should be denied where there was
"a clear legislative intent negating review"206 as in the case of the
Padavan Law. Language pervading the Governor's memorandum
clearly demonstrates an intent to reduce the amount of litigation
over community residence sites and to limit site selection discussions
to municipalities and sponsoring agencies. 20 7 In his memorandum,
the Governor said:
These bills ... implement a far-reaching program to place the
dynamic relationship between State and local governments and
voluntary providers of care to the mentally ill, mentally retarded
and developmentally disabled upon a new footing .... Senate
Bill 8213-B implements my program objective, announced in my
200. Id. at 779, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 956.
201. Id.
202. No. 15601/82, (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County), aff'd, 95 A.D.2d 984, 464 N.Y.S.2d
613 (lst Dep't 1983), Iv. to appeal denied, 60 N.Y.2d 560, 459 N.E.2d 863, 471
N.Y.S.2d 1028 (1980).
203. Id., slip op. at 2.
204. Id.; see also Birch Lane Ad Hoc Comm. v. Slezak, No. 3159/82, (Sup.
Ct. Monroe County 1982), aff'd, 97 A.D.2d 985, 469 N.Y.S.2d 829 (4th Dep't
1983); DiBiase v. Piscitelli, N.Y.L.J., July 14, 1980, at 14, col. 6, aff'd on other
grounds, 87 A.D.2d 611, 448 N.Y.S.2d 35 (2d Dep't 1981), appeal dismissed, 57
N.Y.2d 672, 439 N.E.2d 1248, 454 N.Y.S.2d 1034 (1982). In Grasmere, Karas,
Birch Lane and DiBiase, no appeal was ever taken on the standing issue since
the sponsoring agency won on the merits in each case.
205. Grasmere, 84 A.D.2d at 778, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 957; Karas, No. 15601/82,
slip. op. at 3.
206. See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
207. 1978 McKinney's Sess. Laws at 1821-22.
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State of the State Message, of assuring the involvement of local
governments in the process of determining where new community
residential facilities will be located . . ... [Tihe bill aims to facilitate
the establishment of community residences by discouraging friv-
olous legal challenges that have needlessly delayed proper estab-
lishment of such facilities in the past, at great cost to the litigants.
This legislation attempts to encourage a process of joint discussion
and accommodation between the providers of care and services to
the mentally disabled and representatives of the community, rather
than legal antagonism .... 208
The Governor's program bill also emphasized that the statute was
aimed at requiring "municipal involvement in a process of selecting
and approving sites selected for such facilities by sponsoring
agencies,''209 and "substituting municipal involvement for litigation
as the means [for] expression of community opposition to [the]
establishment of a facility. 2 °10 These statements by the Governor
clearly demonstrate that only the municipality is to have input into
the location of community residence sites and that the statute is
intended to discourage litigation.2 1' While the language of the
Declaration 12 is less clear on this issue, it points out that the statute
was aimed at facilitating development of residences and achieving
cooperation between communities and sponsoring agencies213 and those
aims are not furthered by the granting of standing to neighbors to
challenge community residences. Thus, by permitting neighbors and
homeowners associations to challenge community residence sites, the
courts have interpreted the Padavan Law contrary to the intentions
of its drafters. Without the Padavan Law, neighbors and homeowner
groups would not have any basis to challenge most sites. 2 '
208. Id.
209. Governor's Program Bill No. 303 for 1978, at 1.
210. Id.
211. Id.; 1978 McKinney's Sess. Laws at 1821-22.
212. 1978 N.Y. Laws ch. 468, § 1.
213. Id.
214. See supra notes 38, 146 & 150. In summary, homeowners prior to the
Padavan Law would have had no basis to challenge a state-operated residence or
a privately-run residence with a family-like structure, as in the cases Little Neck
Community Ass'n and Incorporated Village of Freeport. However, homeowners
would have had the right to challenge privately-run residences that did not have
a family-like structure from being based in a single family zone. See Douglaston
Civic Ass'n v. Galvin, 36 N.Y.2d 1, 324 N.E.2d 317, 364 N.Y.S.2d 830 (1974).
Aside from zoning challenges, though, homeowners do not have the legal or moral
right to determine which of their countrymen qualify to be their neighbors, nor
the right to exercise dominion and control over property which they do not own.
Further, they have no right to maintain the status quo in their neighborhood and
their control over property use is only coextensive with the metes and bounds of
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Since all of the courts that have granted neighbors and homeowner
associations standing have rejected the merits of such groups' claims,
the issue of standing has not reached the New York State Court
of Appeals. However, in its recent decision in Crane Neck Association
Inc. v. NYC/Long Island County Services Group,2"5 the court of ap-
peals stated that a "major purpose of section 41.34 [Padavan Law]
• . .was to eliminate the legal challenges that were impeding the imple-
mentation of the State policy." '216 Perhaps, this is an indication that
the court of appeals would rule differently from the lower courts
on the standing issue if a proper case came before it.
IV. Restrictive Covenants
Recognizing their inability to prevent the development of com-
munity residences through Padavan Law challenges, homeowners in
areas covered by restrictive covenants have attempted to enforce
such covenants against community residences on the ground that
they are not single-family dwellings.21 7 As a result of a recent New
York State Court of Appeals decision, " ' that avenue is now closed.
The first challenge to the establishment of a community residence
on the grounds that it would violate a restrictive covenant was
successful. In Tytell v. Kaen,1 9 homeowners covered by a 1919
their own lots. See, e.g., Fieldston Garden Apts. v. City of New York, 7 Misc.
2d 147, 157, 145 N.Y.S.2d 907, 918 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1955), aff'd, 3 A.D.2d
903, 163 N.Y.S.2d 402 (1st Dep't 1957).
215. 61 N.Y.2d 154, 460 N.E.2d 1336, 472 N.Y.S.2d 901, cert. denied, 105 S.
Ct. 60 (1984).
216. Id. at 164, 460 N.E.2d at 1341, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 906.
217. Such attempts can only be contemplated in cases where the purchaser of
a home is a private sponsoring agency or the state is a lessee rather than a
condemnor. If the state acquires the property through the eminent domain procedure,
the restrictive covenant would be extinguished. Ossining Urban Renewal Agency v.
Lord, 39 N.Y.2d 628, 350 N.E.2d 405, 385 N.Y.S.2d 28 (1976); Dan Gernatt Farms
v. Jorza, No. H20125 (Sup. Ct. Erie County 1983); Salmon v. Bogdanoff, No.
12169/81 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1982); Newcomb v. Office of Mental Retardation
and Developmental Disabilities, No. 17454/80 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1981). If
the state is the sponsoring agency and it establishes a community residence pursuant
to the Padavan Law, it is exempt from having to follow the procedures of the
Eminent Domain Procedure Law. N.Y. EMINENT DOMAIN PROCEDURE LAW § 206(E).
If the State acquires property by condemnation, an affected homeowner may apply
for damages in the New York Court of Claims, N.Y. COURT OF CLAIMS ACT § 9
(McKinney 1963 & Supp. 1984-1985). However, it is unlikely that a homeowner would
succeed in collecting any damages. See supra note 7 for studies finding that com-
munity residences do not increase crime or lower property values in neighborhoods.
218. Crane Neck Ass'n v. NYC/Long Island County Servs. Group, 61 N.Y.2d 154,
460 N.E.2d 1336, 472 N.Y.S.2d 901, cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 60 (1984).
219. N.Y.L.J., June 11, 1979, at 12, col. 3 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1979), aff'd,
77 A.D.2d 519, 429 N.Y.S.2d 1018 (1st Dep't 1980).
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covenant220 that previously had been enforced against developers
seeking to construct an apartment building22' sought to enforce the
covenant to block the establishment of a community residence.222
The covenant limited use to "one private dwelling house for the
use of a single family" '  and prohibited the use of premises as
any public or private hospital, sanitorium, or asylum or place
where any person ... may be treated for any illness, disease or
sickness of any nature or kind whatsoever [or] for any public or
private home retreat .... asylum, refuge, convent or school where
any person may be treated, sheltered, cared for, instructed or
taught or any apartment house, tenement house, [or] hotel .... 224
The state supreme court, Bronx County, enforced the covenant to
enjoin the establishment of a proposed community residence. 25 The
court rejected the arguments of the sponsoring agency of the proposed
residence that the statutes and cases finding that community resi-
dences were single-family dwellings for the purposes of local zoning
ordinances were also applicable to restrictive covenants. 226 In en-
forcing the covenant, the court noted that:
[i]nsofar as the framers of these restrictive covenants appear
to have had in mind the traditional concept of "family" at the
time they created the restrictions, the new definition would not
appear to apply to these restrictive covenants. To decide otherwise
would undermine the thoughts, words and concepts of our pred-
ecessors, by policies [that] though desirable and laudatory, never-
theless, are of such recent vintage that the proverbial ink has not
yet had time to dry.227
The supreme court decision in Tytell was thereafter affirmed by the ap-
pellate division, first department 1228
The vitality of Tytell v. Kaen was destroyed by the New York State
Court of Appeals' recent decision in Crane Neck Association, Inc.
v. NYC/Long Island County Services Group.229 In Crane Neck, a
homeowner association and a group of individual homeowners at-
220. N.Y.L.J., June 11, 1979, at 12, col..5.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id. at col. 6.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 13, col. 2.
226. Id. at cols. 1-2.
227. Id. at col. 2.
228. 77 A.D.2d 519, 429 N.Y.S.2d 1018 (1st Dep't 1980).
229. 61 N.Y.2d 154, 159, 460 N.E.2d 1336, 1338, 472 N.Y.S.2d 901, 903 (1984),
cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 60 (1984).
[Vol. XIII
COMMUNITY RESIDENCES
tempted to enforce a 1945 covenant against a community residence
being leased by the state. The covenant stated:
There shall not be constructed nor maintained upon the said
premises any buildings other than single family dwellings and
outbuildings ... [any] house or dwelling costing less than $3500
on the basis of 1944 material and labor costs, . . . [any] building
other than Cape Cod or Colonial design and architecture (and
additional buildings shall conform in architecture to the main
dwelling) and shall be erected on said premises unless plans and
specifications therefor have first been submitted to and approved
in writing by the parties of the first part, or their duly authorized
agent .... 230
The New York State Supreme Court, Suffolk County, granted partial
summary judgment to the Crane Neck Association and the home-
owners,23 ' declaring that the covenant had to be construed to apply
to both the construction and the use of the residential buildings. 232
The court also decided that the occupancy of the premises as a
community residence was violative of the "single family dwelling"
clause of the restrictive covenant.
233
The appellate division, second department reversed the order and
refused to enforce the covenant on the grounds that the residence
was not violative of the restrictive covenant, and the public policy
of the State of New York prohibited the enforcement of the restrictive
covenant against the use of the premises as a community residence.
23 4
The court correctly noted that under New York law restrictions on
the use of land are contrary to the general policy in favor of free
230. 61 N.Y.2d at 158-59, 460 N.E.2d at 1338, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 903. Obviously,
the covenant here is less restricting than the one in Tytell.
231. N.Y.L.J., May 18, 1981, at 15, col. 6 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1981),
rev'd, 92 A.D.2d 119, 460 N.Y.S.2d 69 (2d Dep't 1983), aff'd, 61 N.Y.2d 154,
460 N.E.2d 1336, 472 N.Y.S.2d 901, cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 60 (1984).
232. N.Y.L.J., May 18, 1981, at 16, col. 1. The decision that a restrictive
covenant clause regarding construction also applies to use is reflective of New York
law. Baumert v. Malkin, 235 N.Y. 115, 139 N.E. 210 (1923). However, since the
clause relied upon by the Crane Neck Association discusses the type of architecture
and building materials andthere is another clause in the covenant that lists prohibited
uses (but does not include community residences), 92 A.D.2d at 121, 460 N.Y.S.2d
at 71, it is not clear that the drafters of the covenant intended the clause relied
upon by the Crane Neck Association to affect use as well as construction. The better
law in other jurisdictions is that restrictive covenant clauses regarding construction
do not necessarily apply to use. See, e.g., Berger v. State, 71 N.J. 206, 364 A.2d
993 (1976); Jones v. Park Lane for Convalescents, Inc., 384 Pa. 268, 120 A.2d 535
(1956).
233. N.Y.L.J., May 18, 1981, at 16, col. 2.
234. 92 A.D.2d 119, 460 N.Y.S.2d 69 (2d Dep't 1983).
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and unobstructed use of real property and are to be construed strictly
against those seeking enforcement of covenants. 235 Noting that New
York law provides that if a covenant is susceptible to two construc-
tions, the less restrictive construction will be adopted,23 6 the court
held that the community residence could be considered a "single
family dwelling" for the purpose of the covenant.237 The court stated
that:
[tihe goal is to establish a relatively permanent, stable environment,
operating as a single household unit under a set of houseparents,
which as much as possible bears the generic characteristics of the
traditional family .... [I]t is the emulation of the traditional
family unit which, in our opinion, satisfies the terms of the
restrictive covenant, notwithstanding the lack of a biological or
legal relationship among residents. The primary purpose of that
covenant, preservation of the quality of life and character of the
neighborhood, will not be contravened by the presence of this
group residence . . . . It will represent another "family" in the
235. Id. at 126, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 74; see Huggins v. Castle Estates, 36 N.Y.2d
427, 430, 330 N.E.2d 48, 51, 369 N.Y.S.2d 80, 84 (1975); Premium Point Park
Ass'n v. Polar Bar Inc., 306 N.Y. 507, 512, 119 N.E.2d 360, 362 (1954).
236. 92 A.D.2d at 126, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 74; see Aronson v. Riley, 87 A.D.2d
879, 881, 449 N.Y.S.2d 544, 546 (2d Dep't 1982); Lewis v. Spies, 43 A.D.2d 714,
716, 350 N.Y.S.2d 14, 17 (2d Dep't 1973).
237. 92 A.D.2d at 126-27, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 74-75. This view is consistent with
that of other states that have held that community residences are single family
dwellings for the purposes of restrictive covenants. See Cain v. Delaware Sec. Invs.,
7 Mental Disab. Law Rptr. 384 (Del. Chancery Ct. 1983); Craig v. Bossenberry,
351 N.W.2d 596 (Mich. App. 1984); Leland Acres Homeowners Ass'n v. R.T.
Partnership, 106 Mich. App. 790, 308 N.W.2d 648 (1981); Malcolm v. Shamie, 95
Mich. App.132, 290 N.W.2d 101 (1980); Bellarmine Hills Ass'n v. Residential
Systems Co., 84 Mich. App. 554, 269 N.W.2d 673 (1978); Costley v. Caromin House,
Inc., 313 N.W.2d 21 (Minn. 1981); State v. District Court, 609 P.2d 245 (Mont.
1980); Knudtson v. Trainor, 216 Neb. 653, 345 N.W.2d 4 (1984); Berger v. State,
71 N.J. 206, 364 A.2d 993 (1976); J.T. Hobby & Sons v. Family Homes, 302 N.C.
64, 274 S.E.2d 174 (1980); Crowley v. Knapp, 94 Wis. 2d 42, 288 N.W.2d 815
(1980); cf. Seaton v. Clifford, 24 Cal. App. 3d 46, 100 Cal. Rptr. 779 (1972)
(group home possessed characteristics of business enterprise and thus violated
restrictive covenant); Shaver v. Hunter, 626 S.W.2d 574 (Tex. App. 1981), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 1016 (1982) (sheltered living facility for handicapped did not constitute
"single-family residency" use and thus violated restrictive convenant); Omega Corp.
of Chesterfield v. Malloy, 319 S.E.2d 728 (Va. 1984) (same). However, the vitality
of Seaton is in doubt considering the more recent decision in Welsch v. Goswick,
130 Cal. App. 3d 398, 181 Cal. Rptr. 703 (1982), which noted that the issues
involved related to "changed circumstances in a rapidly developing area of social
concern subject to continuing legislative scrutiny" and that "a 10-year old case is
of limited persuasive value." 130 Cal. App. 3d at 407 n.7, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 708,
709 n. 7; see also Guernsey, The Mentally Retarded and Private Restrictive Covenants,
25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 421, 442 (1984) (provides framework for analyzing
constitutional validity of restrictive covenants).
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community.... [t]he purpose of [this] group home is to be quite
the contrary of an institution and to be a home like other homes.23
The appellate division, second department further held that even if
the residence violated the covenant the state's public policy precluded
enforcement of the covenant. 2 9 The court cited the Padavan Law,
the Declaration, the Governor's memorandum and the Willowbrook
Consent Decree as evidence of the state's public policy in favor of
establishing community residences.2 40 According to the court, this
expressed policy was
broad enough to overcome not only challenges to group residences
which are based upon local zoning ordinances, but also those
based upon private restrictive covenants .... The provisions of
the Padavan Law, which establish guidelines for community par-
ticipation in the site selection process, provide a sufficient check
on the possibility of any one community or neighborhood be-
coming saturated with such residences or of a residence being
placed in an entirely inappropriate locale .... Beyond that, how-
ever, communities and residents should not be permitted to decide
unilaterally by means of restrictive covenants, possibly employing
language more specific than that at bar, that they will not permit
the establishment of group residences in their area.2 4'
The decision of the second department in Crane Neck was more
consistent with established real property law and principles of sta-
tutory construction than that of the court of appeals which affirmed
it. 24 2 The court of appeals criticized the appellate division's reliance
on case law holding that community residences were single family
dwellings for the purposes of local laws and ordinances 243 and decided
that the community residence was not a single family dwelling. It
supported its finding by reasoning that the residents were "twice
outnumbered by a changing, nonresident staff of nurses, physical
and recreational therapists, dieticians and others ' 12 " and that no
houseparents would reside there. 245 The reasoning of the appellate
238. 92 A.D.2d at 127, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 74-75 (citing City of White Plains v.
Ferraioli, 34 N.Y.2d 300, 313 N.E.2d 756, 357 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1974)).
239. 92 A.D.2d at 127, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 75.
240. Id. at 127-29, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 75-76.
241. Id. at 129, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 76.
242. 61 N.Y.2d 154, 460 N.E.2d 1336, 472 N.Y.S.2d 901.
243. Id. at 159-60, 460 N.E.2d at 1338-39, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 904.
244. Id. at 160, 460 N.E.2d at 1339, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 904.
245. Id. The court seemed to be confused as to whether the residence had
houseparents as the court initially noted that "it is not clear from the record that
there have in fact been houseparents." Id. at 157, 460 N.E.2d at 1337, 472 N.Y.S.2d
at 903.
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division that the covenant should not be enforced because its language
was ambiguous and open to two interpretations and that the less
restrictive interpretation should be applied is more logical and more
in accord with past New York law. The reading of the covenant
by the court of appeals, if applied in other cases, would force
prospective buyers and sellers in covenanted areas to "read the
minds" of the covenant's authors. Actually, the parties should be
bound only to the least restrictive interpretation of what is recorded
in the county clerk's office.
However, the court of appeals refused to enforce the covenant on
the ground that to do so would contravene a long-standing public
policy favoring the establishment of such residences.2"6 In support of
this view, the court correctly cited statutes and executive pro-
nouncements favoring development of community residences.2"'
However, the court of appeals went further and held that the section
of the Padavan Law declaring that community residences were single
family units for the purpose of local laws and ordinances precluded
the enforcement of the covenant on public policy grounds.2 8 The court
stated that:
[tlhe fact that subdivision (f) speaks of "local laws and ordi-
nances" thus reflects only the particular grounds that historically
had been invoked to block placement of community residences,
and not a deliberate substantive limitation by the Legislature.
Private covenants restricting the use of property to single-family
dwellings pose the same deterrent to the effective implementation
of the State policy as the local laws and ordinances that had
actually been the subject of the legal challenges. Given the avowed
purpose of this law, we conclude that the Legislature did not
enact subdivision (f) to erase the impediment resulting from single-
family requirements found in laws and ordinances while leaving
it intact in private covenants, and that the subdivision applies to
such deed restrictions as well.2 49
246. Id.
247. Id. at 160-63, 460 N.E.2d at 1339-40, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 904-06.
248. Id. at 163-66, 460 N.E.2d at 1341-43, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 906-08; cf. Ginsberg
v. Yeshiva of Far Rockaway, 45 A.D.2d 334, 358 N.Y.S.2d 477 (2d Dep't 1974),
aff'd, 36 N.Y.2d 706, 325 N.E.2d 876, 366 N.Y.S.2d 418 (1975).
249. 61 N.Y.2d at 164, 460 N.E.2d at 1341, 472 N.Y.S.2d 906-07. The only
advantage of this approach is that it could be used in an argument to deny standing
to homeowners and homeowner groups to bring litigation against community res-
idence sites. See supra notes 195-216 and accompanying text. A stronger case can
be made from the documents cited by the court against granting standing to
homeowners than that made by the court with regard to covenants. Other states
have specific statutes stating that community residences are single family dwellings
for the purpose of both zoning and restrictive covenants. See ARIZ. REV. STAT.
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This interpretation of the Padavan Law is strained and overbroad,
especially considering that there were sufficient policy statements
from other sources to determine the public policy of New York
State regarding community residences. 20 Moreover, its interpretation
is inconsistent with earlier portions of its decision which rejected
the application of cases declaring community residences to be single
family dwellings for the purposes of local zoning laws and ordinances
to this case 2 1 and which conceded that the section of the Padavan
Law declaring community residences to be single family dwellings
for local laws and ordinances had codified those zoning cases.252
The court also held that its application of the Padavan Law did
not violate the contract clause of the Constitution253 because the law
was reasonable and appropriate to effectuate the state's program of
deinstitutionalization.2 14 However, since the court decided not to
enforce the covenant on public policy rather than on pure statutory
grounds,255 it did not have to reach the issue of whether its application
of the Padavan Law violated the contract clause.256
V. Preliminary Injunctions and Temporary Restraining Orders
A favorite tactic of municipalities and homeowner groups at-
tempting to block the development of community residences is to
seek a temporary restraining order 217 or a preliminary injunc-
ANN. § 36.582 (Supp. 1983-1984); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1566.3 (West
Supp. 1985); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 168-22 (1982); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 46.03(22)(d)
(West Supp. 1984-1985).
250. 61 N.Y.2d at 160-63, 460 N.E.2d at 1339-40, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 904-06.
251. Id. at 159-60, 460 N.E.2d at 1338-39, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 903-04.
252. Id.
253. Article I, Section 10 of the U.S. Constitution states, in relevant part, that
"[N]o state shall ... pass any ... law impairing the obligation of contracts."
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
254. 61 N.Y.2d at 167, 460 N.E.2d at 1343, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 908.
255. Id. at 160, 460 N.E.2d at 1339, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 904.
256. Having ruled that the covenant could not be enforced because it would
contravene a long-standing public policy, 61 N.Y.2d 160, 460 N.E.2d 1339, 472
N.Y.S.2d 904, the court should have ignored the contract clause arguments made
by the Crane Neck Association and held that mere impairment of a court order
declaring public policy could not invoke a contract clause challenge. Barrows v.
Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953). Footnote 5 of the decision of the New York Court
of Appeals in Crane Neck, explaining the reasons why the court chose to consider
the contract clause arguments of the Crane Neck Association, appears to conflict
totally with its previous position that public policy precluded it from enforcing the
covenant. Compare portions of the court's opinion at 61 N.Y.2d at 166-67, 460
N.E.2d at 1343, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 908 with earlier portions at 61 N.Y.2d at 160,
460 N.E.2d at 1339, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 904.
257. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 6313 (McKinney 1980). A temporary restraining order
may not be issued against the state in performing a governmental duty. Id. §
6313(a); DiFate v. Scher, 45 A.D.2d 1002,1003, 358 N.Y.S.2d 215, 217 (2d Dep't
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tion2"s against the development of the residence. However, appellate
courts generally have declined to uphold preliminary injunctions
against community residences.25 9 In order for a New York State
court to grant a preliminary injunction, there must be a showing
of both a clear likelihood of ultimate success on the merits and the
existence of irreparable injury if the injunction is not granted.2 60
However, it would be impossible to show irreparable harm since,
as the second department correctly noted, if the objections to a
residence were upheld, the residence would have to be used for any
other legitimate purpose authorized by local zoning laws.2 6' The
second department also has held that "the mere assertion that pe-
titioner [municipality] will be unable to prevent the operation of the
residence at a later date unless it is halted immediately cannot suffice
to carry its burden in this regard [showing of irreparable injury]. 2 62
For temporary restraining orders and orders to show cause, the ap-
pellate courts have been willing to strike down such orders pursuant
to section 5704(a) of the Civil Practice Law and Rules2 63 if such
1974). Establishing facilities forthe mentally disabled is certainly a governmental
function. See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 13.01, 13.07, 13.15(a) (McKinney 1978).
258. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 6301 (McKinney 1980).
259. Roberts v. Selzak, 89 A.D.2d 559, 452 N.Y.S.2d 113 (2d Dep't 1982); Town
of Stony Point v. New York State Office of Mental Retardation and Developmental
Disabilities, 78 A.D.2d 858, 432 N.Y.S.2d 633 (2d Dep't 1980); cf. Town of Pound
Ridge v. Introne, 81 A.D.2d 885, 439 N.Y.S.2d 55 (2d Dep't 1981) (court ruling
based on finding that sponsoring agency had misled municipality about its inten-
tions; decision appears to be an aberration-a situation in which "bad cases make
bad law").
It should be noted that where the state and a private agency are joint sponsors
of a community residence and a lower court issues a preliminary injunction against
the private agency, the state's automatic stay power during an appeal, pursuant
to CPLR Section 5519 (a)(1), covers the private agency as well. N.Y. C.P.L.R. §
5519(a)(1) (McKinney 1980). Therefore, the private agency can continue to develop the
residence during the appeal. See Lake Hawthorne Homeowners Ass'n v. Carey,
103 Misc. 2d 329, 423 N.Y.S.2d 769 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1980). Of
course, if the state is the sponsoring agency, it would have an automatic stay during
an appeal from a preliminary injunction issued by a lower court, pursuant to CPLR
Section 5519(a)(1). N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5519(a)(1) (McKinney 1978).
260. Roberts v. Selzak, 89 A.D.2d 559, 452 N.Y.S.2d 113 (2d Dep't 1982); Town
of Stony Point v. New York State Office of Mental Retardation and Developmental
Disabilities, 78 A.D.2d 858, 432 N.Y.S.2d 633 (2d Dep't 1980); see Picotte Realty,
Inc. v. Gallery of Homes, Inc., 66 A.D.2d 978, 412 N.Y.S.2d 47 (3d Dep't 1978);
Shelborne Beach Club, Inc. v. Hellman, 49 A.D.2d 933, 372 N.Y.S.2d 277 (2d Dep't
1975).
261. Roberts v. Selzak, 89 A.D.2d at 559, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 114.
262. Stony Point, 78 A.D.2d at 859, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 635.
263. Hunt-Comm. Ass'n v. Office of Mental Retardation and' Developmental
Disabilities, No. 84/12774 (2d Dep't 1984); Town of Pleasant Valley v. Wassaic
Developmental Disabilities Servs. Office, 92 A.D.2d 543, 459 N.Y.S.2d 109 (2d Dep't
1983); Lincoln Assoc. v. Introne, No. 24653/80 (2d Dep't 1980).
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application is made prior to the return date of the order to show
cause.264
V1. Recommendations
While in some instances, the Padavan Law has slowed and impeded
the development of community residences,2 65 it has facilitated the
development of some privately-run residences whose structures would
not have been considered single family dwellings for purposes of
local laws and ordinances by the courts prior to the statute.266
According to one commentator, the statute has been useful because
it "frame[d] the conflict between the retarded and the community
in very specific terms, 2 67 and the number of residences opened has
increased at a faster rate since the enactment of the statute. 68 Thus,
it is not recommended that the statute be repealed entirely, but
rather that it be fine-tuned so that it fully reflects the meritorious
intentions of its drafters.2 69
It is recommended that the 1981 amendment applying the statute
to residences for one or two persons 270 be repealed since it discourages
residence development, and it is difficult to comprehend how a
concentration of those residences would result in the substantial
alteration of an area. Moreover, the 1981 amendment requiring the
inclusion of a specific site in the sponsoring agency's notification
letter271 should be repealed. This provision places too great a burden
on the sponsoring agency to commit money to a site that it may
not be able to use and coalesces neighborhood opposition to a site.
Therefore, the statute should be amended back to its original form.
264. Town of Cortlandt v. Office of Mental Retardation and Developmental
Disabilities, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 12, 1980, at 7, col. I (2d Dep't 1980).
265. See supra note 71.
266. Id.
267. ROTHMAN, supra note 1, at 195-96; see also JANICKI, supra note 20, at 9
(statute has been beneficial to community residences).
268. In 1976, there were only 130 community residences in New York. By 1982,
there wre over 1000. JANICKI, supra note 20, at 13. Of the planned residences which
have opened in New York City, 4707o of those planned opened after the statute was
enacted, while only 23% opened prior to the statute's enactment. R.A. LUBIN, A.A.
SCHWARTZ, W.B. ZIGMAN & M.P. JANICKI, COMMUNITY ACCEPTANCE OF RESIDEN-
TIAL PROGRAMS FOR DEVELOPMENTALLY DISABLED PERSONS 10 (1981).
269. See suprg notes 40-60 and accompanying text for statements by the legislature
and Governor Carey strongly stating that it was New York's public policy to take
mentally disabled persons out of institutions and place them in community residences.
270. 1981 N.Y. Laws ch. 1024, § 3.
271. Id.
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Under the original statute, a municipality still could suggest that a
sponsoring agency establish a community residence in certain areas
of its jurisdiction and avoid other areas due to overconcentration.
It is also recommended that the statute's provision requiring the
sponsoring agency to take the municipality's site if it is satisfactory27
be amended to require the sponsoring agency to take the site only
if it is proved, at a commissioner's fact-finding hearing, to be superior
to the sponsoring agency's site and affordable to the sponsoring
agency. While the municipality's suggested alternative site should
not be disregarded, the proposed provision would assure a sponsoring
agency that it could develop its site if it were superior to that
suggested by the municipality. Certainly, the selection of the superior
site would benefit the facility's residents. Furthermore, the statute's
provision that an article seventy-eight proceeding can be brought to
challenge a commissioner's determination after a fact-finding hearing273
should be amended to exclude parties other than municipalities from
bringing such challenges. This amendment would clarify standing
considerations although there is adequate legislative history and prece-
dent available to enable courts to deny neighborhood groups stand-
ing to challenge commissioners' determinations.2 7  Finally, it is
recommended that the statute not be changed to include a definition
of the term "substantial alteration" since any definition would be
inadequate to encompass the myriad neighborhood situations in New
York State, and the courts have had little difficulty deciding cases
under the present definition.
VII. Conclusion
While the drafters of the Padavan Law envisioned that the statute
would facilitate the development of community residences for the
mentally disabled, it is difficult to comprehend how the intricate
statutory procedures to be followed by a sponsoring agency before
establishing a residence have facilitated that development.275 On the
other hand, the statute has limited challenges by narrowing the
272. N.Y. MENTAL HyG. LAW § 41.34(c)(4) (McKinney's Supp. 1984). However,
the appellate division, second department recently held that a municipality must prove
that its proposed alternative site was superior to that proposed by the sponsoring
agency. Town of Oyster Bay v. Webb, N.Y.L.J., June 5, 1985, at 12, col. 3 (2d
Dep't 1985).
273. Id. § 41.34(d).
274. Id. § 41.34(c)(1)(C), (c)(5).
275. See supra notes 71, 145-50 & 267-68 and accompanying text.
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objections that can be raised to a residence, has disciplined slow-
moving sponsoring agencies by setting down a procedural timetable,
and has assisted the development of some residences by declaring
community residences established pursuant to the statute to be single
family dwellings for the purposes of local laws and ordinances.27 6
Moreover, if a sponsoring agency perseveres through the procedures
and subsequent litigation, it should be able to establish its residence.
No court has ever found that a community residence would sub-
stantially alter an area, and it is unlikely that any community
residence in combination with other community residences or similar
facilities would substantially alter an area. Whether the procedure
actually results in greater cooperation and understanding between
communities and sponsoring agencies is unclear. However, one thing
is clear-the statute has not eliminated litigation regarding community
residence sites.
276. Id.
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